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Abstract: The purpose of this study was to examine what kind of information flows 
are required to ensure quality and safety in the food chain for beef, and who should 
produce that information. Studying the willingness to pay of consumers makes it pos-
sible to determine whether the consumers consider the quantity of information avail-
able on the safety and quality of beef sufficient. The empirical scope of the study was 
restricted to beef, because the beef labelling system enables reliable tracing of the 
origin of beef, as well as attributes related to safety, environmental friendliness and 
animal welfare. One of the main findings of this study was that the majority of Finnish 
consumers (73%) regard increased quality information as beneficial. These benefits 
were assessed using the contingent valuation method. The results showed that those 
who were willing to pay for increased information on the quality and safety of beef 
would accept an average price increase of 24% per kilogram. The results showed that 
certain risk factors impact consumer willingness to pay. If the respondents considered 
genetic modification of food or foodborne zoonotic diseases as harmful or extremely 
harmful risk factors in food, they were more likely to be willing to pay for quality in-
formation. The results produced by the models thus confirmed the premise that cer-
tain food-related risks affect willingness to pay for beef quality information. The re-
sults also showed that safety-related quality cues are significant to the consumers. In 
the first place, the consumers would like to receive information on the control of 
zoonotic diseases that are contagious to humans. Similarly, other process-control re-
lated information ranked high among the top responses. Information on any potential 
genetic modification was also considered important, even though genetic modification 
was not regarded as a high risk factor. 
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NAUDANLIHAN LAATUTIEDON LISÄÄMISEN ARVIOINTI CONTINGENT 
VALUATION –MENETELMÄN AVULLA. Pellervon taloudellisen tutkimuslaitoksen 
julkaisuja nro 20. 119 p. ISBN 978-952-224-029-3 (NID), ISSN 0357-5055 (NID), ISBN  
978-952-224-030-9  (PDF), ISSN 1796-4768 (PDF). 
Tiivistelmä: Tässä tutkimuksessa selvitettiin millaisia ja kenen tuottamia infor-
maatiovirtoja tarvitaan laadun ja turvallisuuden todentamiseksi elintarvikeketjussa. 
Kuluttajien maksuhalukkuuden määrittämisellä selvitettiin, onko naudanlihan turvalli-
suutta ja laatua koskevaa informaatiota kuluttajien mielestä riittävästi saatavilla. 
Tutkimuksen empiirinen osa rajattiin koskemaan naudanlihaa, koska naudanlihan 
merkintäjärjestelmä tarjoaa mahdollisuuksia jäljittää luotettavasti lihan alkuperä sekä 
turvallisuutta, ympäristöystävällisyyttä ja eläinten hyvinvointia koskevia ominai-
suuksia. Tämä tutkimus osoitti, että suurin osa suomalaisista kuluttajista (73 %) 
kokee hyötyvänsä uusien naudanlihan laatua ja erityisesti turvallisuutta kuvaavien 
laatutietojen lisäämisestä. Tutkimusmenetelmänä oli contingent valuation –menetel-
mä. Ne kuluttajat, jotka ilmoittivat maksuhalukkuudestaan, maksaisivat laatutiedosta 
noin 24 prosenttia naudanlihan kilohintaan lisää. Tutkimuksessa selvitettiin maksu-
halukkuutta selittäviä tekijöitä ja osoitettiin, että tietyt riskitekijät selittävät kuluttajien 
maksuhalukkuutta. Jos vastaajat pitivät geenimuuntelua tai eläinperäisiä zoonooseja 
haitallisena tai erittäin haitallisena riskitekijänä elintarvikkeissa, sitä todennäköi-
semmin he olivat valmiita maksamaan laatutiedosta. Mallien tulokset vahvistavat sen 
käsityksen, että tietyt turvallisuuteen liittyvät riskitekijät lisäävät maksuhalukkuutta 
laatutiedosta. Tulokset osoittivat myös, että turvallisuuteen liittyvät laatuvihjeet ovat 
merkityksellisiä kuluttajille. Suomalaiset kuluttajat kaipaavat nykyisten pakkaus-
merkintöjen lisäksi tietoa tilavalvonnoista eläintautien suhteen, lääkeaineiden käytön 
valvonnasta ja eläinten geenimuuntelusta, vaikkakaan geenimuuntelua ei yleisesti 
pidetty kovin suurena riskitekijänä elintarvikkeissa. 
Avainsanat: elintarvikkeiden turvallisuus, jäljitettävyys, laatuvihjeet, contingent va-
luation, naudanliha. 
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Terminology 
 
Adverse selection: A market condition caused by asymmetric information, 
whereby only inferior products enter the markets. 
Asymmetric information: Information that is unevenly divided between 
the various economic actors. For example, in the food chain, a pro-
ducer often possesses more information on production methods than 
an actor who purchases raw materials for further processing. The dis-
advantages caused by asymmetric information may be mitigated 
through actions such as production contracts and quality certification 
of operation and processes. 
Consumer surplus: The difference between the total willingness to pay of 
an individual and the price of a given good. 
Contingent valuation (CV): A research method used to study consumer 
willingness to pay for a given good. The name of the method derives 
from the fact that consumer willingness to pay is dependent, or con-
tingent on a proposed scenario. 
Dichotomic question format: A binomial question format that elicits “Yes” 
or “No” responses. Also known as the referendum question format. 
Free rider: A consumer who may be able to avoid paying for the consump-
tion of a given good. 
Hypothetical bias: The difference between the willingness to pay quoted in 
a survey and the willingness to pay occurring in reality. 
Market failure: The inability of the markets to achieve an optimal allocation 
of resources. 
Moral hazard: A change in the division of a risk between various actors, 
with a consequent change in individual human behaviour; for example, 
taking out car insurance may influence an individual’s car driving be-
haviour. 
Neoclassical economics: In general, economics refer to the tradition of 
Neoclassical economics. An economic analysis generally relies on three 
premises: individual preferences, minimal resources, and the maximi-
sation of individual utility. 
Pareto efficiency: The state of an economy is Pareto efficient when the 
welfare of any single individual cannot be improved without negatively 
affecting the welfare of another individual. The term was coined after 
Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist. 
Public good: A pure public good can be consumed by everybody, regardless 
of the payer. 
Public sector: In economics, a decision-making sector besides industry and 
households. At its widest, the public sector is considered to include 
public bodies such as states and municipalities as well as public insti-
tutions and companies. 
Random utility model (RUM): This model assumes that the factors affect-
ing individual decision-making processes remain unknown to some ex-
tent; thus, a random error term, ε, is included in the model (McFadden 
1974). 
Utility: In economics, the satisfaction of needs or welfare impact caused or 
facilitated by the use of resources. 
Value: (a) A relative measure of importance or desirability used in the com-
parison of at least two goods. 
In Neoclassical economics, values reflect individual preferences. In 
short: price times quantity. 
(b) In psychology, values are reflected in individual attitudes. Values 
are more permanent than attitudes. 
Welfare: The sum total of individual levels of utility in a society. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 To food safety policies through food safety crises 
 
The safety of food in the food chain has become an increasingly interesting 
issue to consumers and the media. It has also become a source of concern, 
as the amount of information on the risks related to food safety continues to 
expand. Food safety and risks emerged as topics in the 1980s, when con-
taminated hamburgers caused deaths in the United States. In Europe, the 
first major food safety crisis began with the spreading from Britain of BSE 
(Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), or the so-called mad cow disease, 
which was associated with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans. Dis-
coveries of high levels of the carcinogenic substance dioxin in food, coupled 
with threatening images of global contraction by humans of zoonotic dis-
eases such as most recently the avian influenza, have contributed to the fact 
that concepts of risk and safety have become permanent issues in discus-
sions on food and quality. 
 In Finland, the level of consumer trust in the functioning of the food 
chain is good, and for the time being, no major crises related to food safety 
have occurred. A single case of a cow with BSE was diagnosed in Finland in 
2001, but its impact on the consumption of beef remained short-lived. In 
spring 2006, avian influenza affected the consumption of poultry, but again 
its impact in Finland remained noticeably more moderate than elsewhere in 
Europe, in the absence of actual diagnosed cases in production animals (PTT 
Katsaus 2006). 
 To improve food safety in Europe, and to restore consumer trust, the 
European Commission presented important measures in its White Paper on 
Food Safety1 (COM 2000). Proposed actions included the creation of the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and reinforcement of the “farm to 
table” approach in food legislation. The White Paper emphasised the respon-
sibility for food safety by all stakeholders in the food chain, and called for 
improvements in the traceability of feed, food and their ingredients. Respon-
sibility for food safety increasingly shifted from the public sector to the 
hands of the operators in the food chain. The White Paper further empha-
                                                     
1 In White Papers, the European Commission outlines official proposals for European 
Union action in specific political areas. A White Paper is published after a Green Paper 
has first been published to prompt public discussion and an EU consultation process. 
Published Papers are available at: http://europa.eu/documents/comm/index_en.htm 
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sised the consumers’ need for clear and accurate information on the quality, 
composition and potential risks of food. 
 In Finland, the “farm to table” quality process was launched in 1999, 
when a commitment was made to improve the quality of products and pro-
duction processes through the creation of the National Quality Strategy. 
Shifting the responsibility for quality increasingly to all stakeholders in the 
food chain underlines the importance of conveying reliable and accurate in-
formation through the entire food chain up to consumer level, in order to 
create economic incentives for the production of quality food. This, in turn, 
requires good traceability for food and its ingredients. Companies and corpo-
rations have made improvements to the traceability of food, e.g. by imple-
menting in-house control systems. At the moment, various product data sys-
tems are also rapidly being developed. At the beginning of 2005, the Euro-
pean Union General Food Law on traceability (EC/178/2002) came into ef-
fect. For beef, the requirements for traceability and notification of origin are 
even stricter than this directive stipulates. 
 There are various reasons why public control of food markets is needed, 
e.g., through legislation. Attributes and characteristics related to the quality 
and safety of food are so-called public goods. In economics, the term refers 
to the attributes that the markets often fail to price correctly, and that have 
no value on the market. In practice, it means that neither food safety nor a 
product’s food safety attributes have a market price, and thereby the market 
mechanism alone does not function efficiently enough to contribute to the 
production of quality products. On the markets, quality products do not fetch 
higher prices, even if their production costs are higher. In economics, this 
phenomenon is termed market failure. 
 In this case, market failure is caused by a lack of relevant information 
on product quality, and as a consequence the standard of quality of the 
goods on the market declines. Because the markets fail to contribute effi-
ciently to the quality of food, it is necessary for the public sector to take ac-
tion to ensure a minimum standard for the quality of food on the market. 
 In addition to the quality control and standardisation implemented by 
the public sector and operators in the food chain, information remedies can 
be used as a political measure. One form of information remedy or guidance 
is package labelling. On food markets, package labelling can include both 
mandatory labelling regulated by the public sector, and producers’ own vol-
untary labelling, which strives to highlight the qualities that make their 
product unique in comparison with rival products. 
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1.2 Objectives of the study 
 
Although the quantity of information on the safety and quality of food in the 
food chain is constantly growing, there has been no significant increase in 
the amount of information available to the consumers, even though devel-
opments in the food industry are aimed at better consumer orientation. Con-
sumers’ informational needs have been researched very little. 
 The purpose of this study was to examine what kind of information 
flows are required to ensure quality and safety in the food chain for beef, 
and who should produce that information. Studying the willingness to pay of 
consumers makes it possible to determine whether the consumers consider 
the quantity of information available on the safety and quality of beef suffi-
cient. This was also a clear and concrete contribution of this study. 
 The empirical scope of the study was restricted to beef, because the 
beef labelling system enables reliable tracing of the origin of beef, as well as 
attributes related to safety, environmental friendliness and animal welfare. 
The objectives of this study were as follows: 
(I) To determine the average consumer willingness to pay for increased 
quality and safety information in the beef supply chain. 
(II) To identify factors contributing to consumers’ willingness to pay, such as 
perceived risk and trust in the operators of the food chain. 
(III) To determine the type of information that consumers require in addition 
to current package labelling. 
(IV) To determine which operators in the food chain produce the most reli-
able information. 
 
 
1.3 Concepts of food safety and quality in food economics 
 
Public goods 
 
The objectives of this study formed a basis for identifying quantitative, eco-
nomic values through a political change, i.e. the provision of information on 
the safety and quality of food. This phenomenon has two mutually depend-
ent dimensions: information on one hand, and food safety on the other. In-
formation on the attributes of a given product is in itself a good. Further-
more, the two dimensions share a trait: both are public goods. 
 A characteristic of public goods is that they can be consumed without 
affecting their availability to other consumers, and their rights of ownership 
can be neither precisely determined nor restricted. Information is usually 
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considered a pure public good. This attribute can be regarded as one of the 
reasons why markets fail to produce enough information on the safety and 
quality of food (Henson and Traill 1993). If information and food safety are 
interpreted as pure public goods, with insufficient supply, public authorities 
must assume the role of providers of public goods. 
 On the food market, a specific attribute of information is that it is con-
sumed as a “by-product” of food. A product that resembles a public good but 
whose rights of ownership can be restricted to a specific consumer group is 
called a club good (Antle 1999). In such a case, instead of merely producing 
information, public authorities must create a framework favourable for the 
production of information, thus enabling consumers to receive and use it 
(Antle 1999). 
 
Quality and safety as attributes of food 
 
Food quality has grown into a very comprehensive concept which, in addition 
to the physical quality attributes of food, covers aspects such as service and 
the quality of the production process (MMM 2000). Food safety has become 
an increasingly important attribute. Caswell (1998) defined food safety as a 
specific attribute. Table 1 presents a classification of the most important 
food quality attributes, including safety (risk factors), nutritional, sensory, 
process-related, usage and packaging attributes. 
 Finnish consumer studies on the quality of food paint a colourful picture 
of the consumers’ perceptions of quality. In the early studies, the highest-
ranking components were freshness and a Finnish origin (Taloustutkimus 
1998). Later interviews conducted by Finnish food-industry experts demon-
strated that consumers consider food safety a basic priority, to which all 
other attributes are secondary (Viinisalo and Leskinen 2000). 
 For meat products, the highest ranking selection criteria are price, ori-
gin, quality and freshness (Finfood Lihatiedotus 2008). Aspects related to the 
production of food and animal welfare do not rank among the main selection 
criteria. On the other hand, the quality of animal feed is increasing in impor-
tance. However, it must be noted that for many of these attributes, consum-
ers have no available information for use as product selection criteria. In 
terms of information on the origin of food, consumers have better selection 
criteria for meat products than for other foodstuffs. 
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Table 1.  Classification of food quality attributes 
 
I  Food safety attributes 
Heavy metals Drug residues 
Pesticide and herbicide residues Food additives 
Naturally occurring substances Bacteria and viruses that cause food 
 
II  Nutritional attributes 
Calories Fat 
Fibre Vitamins 
Proteins Carbohydrates 
 
III Sensory attributes 
Freshness Tenderness 
Taste Texture  
Appearance  
 
IV Process-related attributes 
Animal welfare Pesticide and herbicide use 
Environmental impact In-house control and quality 
Occupational health Traceability 
 
V Usage attributes 
Purpose of use  
Storage  
  
VI Package attributes 
Package materials Suitability 
Package labelling Disposability 
 
 
Positioning of the subject of the study among the field of food economics 
 
In the field of food safety, “Economics of Food Safety”, edited by Caswell 
(1991), was among the first publications. Studies related to food safety have 
often drawn on the theories and methods of environmental economics, such 
as risk, uncertainty, asymmetric information and negative externalities 
(Wiegand 1994). Of the methodological approaches, the most common are 
econometric models based especially on qualitative variables such as the 
cost of illness method, and on valuation methods used for non-market 
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goods, such as the contingent valuation method. In the 2000s, the CE or 
choice experiment method has been among the most commonly used meth-
ods in the valuation of non-market goods. 
 In Europe, economic research into food safety issues increased noticea-
bly in the 1990s, propelled by food safety crises. European research into 
food safety mostly focuses on product marketing related consumer surveys 
aimed at investigating the connection between quality cues and perceived 
quality (Bredahl 2003, Henson 1996, Henson 2000, Henson and Northern 
2000). Issues related to food safety and labelling have been studied by 
Angulo et al. (2005), Verbeke and Viaene (1999a), and Verbeke and Viaene 
(1999b). 
 In Finland in the late 1990s, food safety also became a subject of study 
from an economic perspective. Siikamäki (1997) applied the contingent 
valuation method to assess the willingness of consumers to pay for reduced 
use of pesticides. Maijala and Peltola (2000) used a cost-benefit analysis to 
investigate the economic impact of the Salmonella control program on the 
food chain. Virolainen and Niemi (2000) have studied the economic effects of 
genetic modification in Finland. In addition, the overall economic effects of 
food-transmitted zoonotic diseases have been examined by Kilpeläinen et al. 
(2004). 
 Closely related to food safety are the risks perceived by consumers, and 
their trust in the operators in the food chain. In Finland, trust or perceived 
risks have been investigated by Aakkula et al. (2005), Piiroinen et al. 
(2004), Viinisalo and Leskinen (2000), and Järvelä (1998), among others. 
Issues related to quality and social responsibility in the food chain have been 
examined by Forsman-Hugg et al. (2006), among others. 
 
 
1.4 Structure of the study 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the traceability of food in the food chain, with special 
emphasis on the traceability of beef using the beef labelling system. 
 Chapter 3 examines quality and quality signals using various theoretical 
frameworks, applying the theories to the operation of food markets. The 
provision of quality-related information in particular has an impact on the 
operation of food markets, as well as market failure. Chapter 3 also dis-
cusses cues available on food quality, and consumers’ perceptions of quality. 
The end of Chapter 3 cites studies on the impact of risks on consumer choice 
process, and ways to acquire further information. 
 7 
 Chapter 4 describes the concepts derived from welfare economics that 
are essential to consumer willingness to pay. These concepts underlie the 
method of the study, i.e. the contingent valuation method. This chapter also 
introduces the contingent valuation method, as well as the operationalisation 
of consumer willingness to pay. 
 Chapter 5 presents the data of the study together with findings on the 
factors related to the consumers’ selection and purchase of beef. Chapter 5 
also includes the empirical results on the use of beef, selection criteria, per-
ceived risks and trust in the operators in the food chain. 
 Econometric modelling of consumer willingness to pay as well as the 
estimation results are described in Chapter 6. 
 The discussion section in Chapter 7 concludes the study. 
 Chapter 8 presents a summary of the study in Finnish. 
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2 TRACEABILITY AND INFORMATION IN THE 
FOOD CHAIN 
 
 
2.1 Requirement for traceability in the food chain 
 
In its White Paper on Food Safety, the European Commission proposed po-
litical actions to ensure a high standard of both public health protection and 
consumer protection. The Paper states that in order to cover the entire food 
chain, a food safety policy must be based on a “farm to table” approach. The 
primary responsibility for food safety falls on feed manufacturers, farmers 
and food business operators. 
 As a specific action, the European Commission called for improvements 
in the traceability of animal feed, production animals, food and ingredients. 
Feed and food manufacturers and operators are responsible for ensuring 
their ability to recall from the market any contaminated products, if they are 
hazardous to consumer health. Food business operators must also keep suf-
ficient records on suppliers of raw materials and ingredients, as well as 
product delivery destinations. In terms of traceability, the principle is that an 
operator must be able to trace raw materials at least one step forward and 
one step backward in the food chain. The Directive does not necessarily de-
mand so-called internal traceability, or information on the ingredients of a 
given food.  
 The principles formed the foundation for the General Food Law of the 
European Union (EC/178/2002). Article 18 describes food traceability re-
quirements. The Directive also sets out requirements for the responsibilities 
of food and food business operators (Article 17), recall of food and food-
stuffs, and communication with authorities and consumers (Articles 19-20). 
The food and feed traceability regulations came into effect on 1 January 
2005. For some foodstuffs and their attributes, even stricter traceability re-
quirements apply than those specified in this general Directive. These in-
clude organic foods, genetically modified foods, beef, chicken eggs and 
vegetables (Suojanen and Haikonen 2004). 
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2.2 The labelling system and traceability of beef 
 
The Finnish Bovine Register was the first officially ratified bovine register 
within the European Union. In use since 1995, the Finnish Bovine Register 
has also found wider applicability in farm animal production planning as well 
as the monitoring and payment of animal-specific subsidies. To stabilise the 
beef markets shaken by the BSE crisis, the European Union created a beef 
labelling system (EC/1760/2000, EC/1825/2000, 1203/2001/MMM). The 
primary objective of the labelling system is to introduce transparency and 
traceability to the beef production chain. The labelling system enables beef 
to be traced back to the production farm, or even the production animal. 
 The labelling of beef begins at the birth of a calf, with the insertion of 
yellow eartags into each ear. The tag bears a unique bovine identification 
number that stays with the animal throughout its life. The owner reports the 
details of an eartagged calf to the bovine register, maintained by public au-
thorities. The sale of an animal from one farm to another is always reported 
to the register. The last report made by the owner details the slaughter-
house where the animal was sent. 
 In one eartag, the animal has a number that facilitates the tracing of 
information, e.g., on its feeding, as well as any illness and medication. The 
unique bovine ID follows the carcass through the slaughterhouse and all the 
way to the meat counter. In the store, it is mandatory to identify the origin 
of both domestic and imported beef both on the labels of pre-packaged 
products and in the immediate vicinity of products sold over the counter. 
Because the beef labelling system also provides the means for gathering re-
liable data on the feeding and care of production animals, the scope of this 
case study was restricted to beef. 
 
 
2.3 Traceability between operators and retailers in the food 
chain 
 
Efficient Consumer Response, or ECR, is the term used for the traceability 
procedures adopted by the food industry and retailers for the best interests 
of the consumers. ECR is an industry strategy designed to eliminate unnec-
essary costs and make operation more consumer-oriented. In 2003, the re-
tail sector and food industry began to implement this strategy by building a 
product data system that allows product data to be stored in the databank 
by using European Article Number, or EAN codes. The system was taken into 
use in September 2004. By January 2008, some 420 suppliers had signed 
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up, and some 66,000 products had been entered into the system. Compa-
nies can enter their product data electronically into a single shared databank 
called the Sinfos Article Master Data Pool, where the data is available to all 
retail groups2. This makes the communication of product information from 
the industry to the retailers efficient. This product data system illustrates the 
fact that current IT and communications technology already provides the 
capability for efficient transfer of extensive amounts of data compiled in pri-
mary production, e.g. during the beef production process, to the industry 
and retail levels. 
                                                     
2 For more information on the Sinfos Article Master Data Pool, see http://www.sinfos.fi 
(in Finnish). 
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2.4 The National Quality Strategy of Finland and ELATI 
Quality Data System Network 
 
In autumn 1997, the Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry established 
a Quality Board. This Quality Board was tasked with, among other things, 
the creation and management of a national competitive strategy based on 
the quality of Finnish food and foodstuffs. A crucial element in this strategy 
is the involvement of every stakeholder in the Finnish food chain, in line with 
the “farm to table” approach. The vision of the Finnish Quality Strategy for 
the Food Sector was crystallised as follows: the production of safe and high-
quality food by drawing on national strengths. Using systematic quality proc-
esses, food will be produced in a consumer-oriented, feasible and competi-
tive manner, respecting humans, animals and nature (MMM 2000). 
 In 2001, the first review of the quality strategy (Silén 2001) showed 
that in primary production, extensive quality improvement actions were still 
in their initial stages. However, the food industry perceived the concept of 
quality through the quality of both products and operation processes. Natu-
rally, the retailers held the most consumer-oriented view of quality. Regard-
less of improvements in quality processes, consumers still see few results 
from these development efforts. According to Silén (2001), the food chain 
requires a higher degree of quality awareness in general and consumer focus 
in particular. 
 As part of the National Quality Strategy, a food quality data system 
called ELATI was developed. Its primary task is “to prove the origin and pro-
duction methods of Finnish food and foodstuffs to consumers in Finland and 
abroad, and to provide information to the various stakeholders in the quality 
chain as a basis for continuous development of operation” (Seppänen 2000). 
The system also facilitates the following actions to gather and process scat-
tered quality information from the food industry, in order to create a more 
accurate view of the standard of quality of the Finnish food industry, and to 
observe developments in quality processes. Reviewed summaries can be ef-
ficiently sent to the bodies responsible for the communication of information, 
so that consumers receive increasingly better information on food quality.3  
 Rapid development towards increasingly consumer-oriented operation is 
currently taking place throughout the food chain. On one hand, the traceabil-
ity of products allows for safer products with better quality, while, on the 
                                                     
3 For further information on the ELATI Quality Data System Network, see: 
http://www.laatuketju.fi (in Finnish). 
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other hand, more efficient control of the food chain allows for savings in 
costs.  
 Chapter 3 looks at how consumers form their perceptions of food qual-
ity. The chapter also discusses the reasons for the potential failure of the 
markets to operate efficiently enough to contribute to product quality, and 
the impact on product quality caused by the unavailability of sufficient in-
formation on the markets. 
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3 CONSUMER ORIENTED QUALITY AND QUALITY 
ATTRIBUTES IN THE FOOD CHAIN 
 
 
This chapter examines the dynamic process by which consumers form their 
perceptions of the quality of food products. In this context, quality is there-
fore mainly defined from the consumers’ perspective. If the whole food chain 
strives towards consumer orientation, the most significant quality cues af-
fecting consumer choice processes should then appear as observable attrib-
utes in the buying situation. 
 Chapter 3.1.1 positions the research on food safety and quality among 
the fields of economics. It explains how essential the available amount of 
information is for the efficient operation of the markets. The economics of 
information are applied as the theoretical framework here. This chapter in-
troduces a classification of quality attributes of goods based on the ability of 
consumers to estimate quality levels prior to purchase, or before or after 
consumption. The lack of information on the food market entitles public au-
thorities to control the minimum quality level of food products. Chapter 3.1.3 
introduces the market conditions that justify such control actions. 
 The paradigm4 of information economics describes information and 
market conditions, but fails to provide an exhaustive explanation of con-
sumer behaviour under these conditions. Chapter 3.2 examines the supply of 
quality cues in the food chain, since consumer perceptions of quality are 
based on extrinsic quality cues. In food science, there are many complemen-
tary theoretical frameworks on consumer behaviour. Chapter 3.2.1 presents 
the most extensive of them, Grunert’s (1997) Total Food Quality Model. 
Chapter 3.2.2 introduces the concept of risk: how consumers form their risk 
perceptions, and how these individual perceptions affect the actions con-
sumers take to alleviate perceived risks, such as gathering more information 
on the goods at issue. Confidence in the information suppliers is considered 
                                                     
4 One of the most influential philosophers of science in the twentieth century, Thomas 
Kuhn, argued that science evolves by jumps from one paradigm to another, therefore 
not only by changing a single theoretical framework using the scientific procedure of 
argumentation and proof. The use of the word ‘paradigm’ here illustrates that 
information economics represents a fundamental change in the prevailing Neoclassical 
paradigm within economics (Stigliz 2002). An example of this paradigm shift occurred 
in 2001, when the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to George A. 
Akerlof, Joseph E. Stingler and A. Michael Spence, for their pioneering analyses of 
markets with asymmetric information. 
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in Chapter 3.2.4. A condensed summary of the hypotheses to be empirically 
tested is presented in Chapter 3.3. 
 
 
3.1 Food safety and quality in the context of economics 
 
3.1.1 Imperfect information and consumer choice 
 
Neoclassical microeconomics maintains an implicit assumption that under 
conditions of perfect competition, economic actors have perfect information. 
According to this assumption, all sellers and buyers know the quality proper-
ties of the products sold on the market. This assumption holds if the quality 
of the goods is easily observable and without costs. If good and bad quality 
attributes are differentiated in the market, the prices of the goods will reflect 
the differences in quality. However, if quality information is too expensive, 
the buyers and sellers are unlikely to share the same information on quality. 
 Akerlof’s model (1970) showed that markets fail in the presence of in-
formation asymmetry. He argued that if information asymmetry exists be-
tween sellers and buyers, bad quality ultimately drives out good quality from 
the markets. This phenomenon is called adverse selection, and it leads to a 
lower quality level on the markets. Therefore, if quality-related information 
asymmetry exists in a free market situation, only lower quality is offered for 
sale. 
 Becker (2000) applied this example to the operation of the meat mar-
ket. In today’s meat chain, raw materials may be purchased from further 
and further away, whereby information on the characteristics of the meat is 
not as easily available as when the meat is directly bought from local pro-
ducers. The production of high quality foodstuffs generates higher costs, and 
if higher quality fetches no additional price on the markets, only inferior 
products enter the markets and overall product quality will deteriorate. This 
means that the quality of the products for consumption also declines. How-
ever, consumers might be willing to pay more for higher quality, thus com-
pensating for the higher production costs, if the differences in quality were 
efficiently communicated to them. 
 Important progress was made in the framework of information econom-
ics when goods were classified into search, experience and credence goods, 
based on how consumers evaluate their quality attributes. Firstly, a search 
good is one whose quality is determined before purchase (Stigler 1961). For 
example, in the case of food products, buyers can examine attributes such 
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as colour, structure or extrinsic defects. Secondly, an experience good is one 
whose quality is determined after purchase on the basis of taste and compo-
sition (Nelson 1970, 1974). If we consider food safety issues, acute food-
borne illnesses caused, for instance, by Salmonella, EHEC and Listeria bacte-
ria fall into this category. Thirdly, many of the characteristics related to the 
safety of foodstuffs are classified as credence attributes. The quality of a 
credence good cannot be determined either before or after purchase (Darby 
and Karni 1973, Wilde 1980).  
 In the case of food risks that can only be observed in the long term, it is 
very difficult to establish a connection between the quality of the original 
food product and the illness it may have caused (Henson and Traill 1993). 
For example, in 40% of the human cases classified as foodborne illnesses in 
Finland, the bacteria or virus could not be identified (Evira 2007). Many of 
the characteristics related to the safety of foodstuffs are classified as cre-
dence quality attributes, because the consumers cannot by themselves as-
sess them without having to rely on the sellers or outside observers for addi-
tional information (Andersen 1994). 
 The availability of quality information is very important for the operation 
of the markets. Markets function quite well in terms of characteristics based 
on external observation and, to some extent, experience quality attributes. 
This is because consumers learn about quality after using the products. 
However, in the case of credence quality attributes, both private and public 
measures are needed for the markets to function properly, and in order to 
guarantee the availability and quality of the necessary information (Caswell 
and Mojduszka 1996). 
 Based on the above classification, Becker (2000) focused on the costs 
caused by the need to acquire more information. These costs are lowest for 
the quality attributes that rely on external sensory observation. Advance 
quality assessment of experience goods involves high costs, but these at-
tributes can be assessed quite easily and at low cost during or after con-
sumption. However, in the case of credence attributes, quality assessment 
involves high costs both before and after consumption. 
 
 
3.1.2 Credibility of quality signals 
 
As information economics illustrated, inferior product quality is a conse-
quence of adverse selection on the markets. In this case, one solution to 
these problems is market signalling (Spence 1973). For example, in the food 
chain, stakeholders with information superiority might signal through actions 
 16 
or agreements that they do not intend to take advantage of the situation. 
Consequently, this mitigation of information advantages strengthens the 
credibility of given information. 
 The information structure of a market situation can be defined as fol-
lows: information is perfect when the buyer has complete knowledge of the 
quality of the products, and this information can be observed with certainty. 
Perfect information is also termed noiseless information (Phlips 1989). In-
formation may also be incomplete, yet at the same time it can be noiseless. 
In many cases, available information may be both incomplete and imperfect. 
In many market situations, information is partly incomplete and noisy, 
meaning that signals cannot be observed with certainty (Phlips 1989). 
 Next, this definition of the information structure is applied to food safety 
issues on the food market. A feature of food safety is that it is practically 
impossible to detect all hazards in all food lots entering the food markets. In 
addition, elements of quality information may go out of date. An example of 
this is bacterial contamination, which might take place at various points in 
the food chain. Therefore, it can be argued that the structure of quality in-
formation in the food chain may be incomplete and imperfect. 
 The structure of quality information highlights the need to identify food 
safety hazards and the phases in the food chain where the risks can be di-
minished. This is a normal routine in the risk assessment process. It is very 
important to identify and delimit the risks to the various stakeholders in the 
food chain. For example, some quality properties only originate at the begin-
ning of the food chain, such as the use of antibiotics and animal hormones 
on farms, and the resulting quality information does not change later in the 
food chain. In this case, the core function of the information structure is to 
convey information from this particular point forward, and this quality infor-
mation remains unchanged later in the food chain. For microbiological risks, 
however, the information structure is more complicated because contamina-
tion can occur at various points in the food chain. If this is the case, it is es-
sential to diminish risks starting from the very beginning of the food chain, 
and to increase consumer information. 
 One problem with quality signalling is that it may lead to a so-called 
moral hazard. This means that after sending quality signals, the market ac-
tors may change their behaviour. To guarantee the credibility of quality sig-
nals, the contents of the contracts between the market actors are vital. Pro-
ducers themselves form a potential source of information, since they usually 
know the quality they deliver, but private claims should be proven credible. 
If a company's claims were associated with its economic activity, this infor-
mation would be more credible (Ippolito 1986). Thereby, a possible loss of 
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corporate reputation combined with resulting business losses prohibits the 
exploitation of informational advantages (Klein and Leffler 1981). 
 Markets may fail to produce quality signals as well as actual quality. 
Anania and Nistico (2003) employed three scenarios to analyse how produc-
ers and consumers can change their behaviour based on the credibility of 
public regulation as a substitute for the lacking information and trust. In 
their definition, trust refers to the situations where consumers make their 
choice based on an act of faith in the producer. 
 The existence of the markets for credence goods is made possible either 
by the reputation of the sellers, or a production process certified for quality 
by a third party such as the public authorities or an external quality board. 
This guarantees a specific standard of quality and provides a substitute for 
the lacking information and trust. Results showed that for premium quality 
producers, public regulation is a better option, because, while imperfect, it 
allows the existence of markets for higher quality products. The model also 
explained why consumers are willing to pay higher prices: high quality mar-
kets offer higher minimum prices. 
 In terms of information and labelling, market failure may occur in many 
ways. It may manifest itself as exploitation of labelling and brands. In eco-
nomics, this is the so-called free-rider problem. For example, the forgery of 
a label of origin may dilute consumer confidence in the label. Freely-
operated markets may also produce too much information. Oversupply of 
information may generate artificial differences between products, whereby a 
specific product is groundlessly promoted, compared with other similar prod-
ucts. Information overload and incongruousness of information may also 
confuse consumers. Manufacturers often have an information advantage in 
terms of both quality and quality signals. In some cases, information re-
quirements may also become an obstacle for small and medium sized com-
panies, because quality information may be too expensive to produce 
(Henson 2000). 
 
 
3.1.3 Food quality and measures of the public sector 
 
The public sector, including food control authorities, has strong grounds for 
action when adverse selection occurs (Tuomala 1997). The aim of the public 
sector is to correct or mitigate consequences of the above described market 
imperfection. The public sector can use various political instruments to alle-
viate these market imperfections. These market interventions can be classi-
fied into two main categories: public measures such as legislation (e.g., beef 
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labelling system, traceability) and mandatory labelling (e.g., country of ori-
gin, “use by” date), and private measures such as the producers’ proprietary 
quality labels, in-house quality control systems and third-party quality certi-
fication. 
 Magat and Viscusi (1992) listed many public measures for controlling 
the quality of goods on the market. Firstly, if a specific risk is non-existent or 
insignificant, the public sector should not intervene in the functioning of the 
markets. Secondly, if the risk is high enough to call for immediate interven-
tion, the public sector may ban the sales or marketing of risky products or 
services. As such, this is a very rapid and effective response to problems 
such as food safety on the markets. Thirdly, a more moderate public meas-
ure is to set acceptable risk levels by means of legislation. This can be di-
rected to the control of the quality of the good itself, or also to the imple-
mentation of operational quality standards, such as mandatory in-house con-
trol systems in the food industry. Legislation is easily focused on specific 
quality problems, but as a remedy for market imperfection, it is naturally a 
slow process compared to a sales ban. 
 One of the weaknesses of legal actions is that they require abundant 
societal resources. In Finland, food control authorities spent 30 million euros 
in 2002 (Niemi 2002), or approximately 6 euros per Finnish resident. How-
ever, according to Niemi’s results (2002), the Finnish municipal control au-
thorities actually require additional financial resources. 
 The fourth option available to the public sector is informational guidance 
or remedy. In this case, the role of the public sector is to increase the 
amount of information on the risks related to the consumption of specific 
products, while the final assessment of the risks involved in using the prod-
ucts is left to the consumers. Informational guidance can include measures 
such as labelling, the control of promotional claims, the provision of con-
sumer information, and education and controls on product names (Henson 
and Traill 1993). 
 By means of mandatory labelling, the public sector can seek to elicit 
private information that the markets may otherwise fail to produce. The 
underlying motive is that this information is too costly for the consumers to 
obtain. Especially as regards credence attributes, mandatory labels convey 
information that the markets fail to produce in sufficient amounts, or with 
enough credibility (Caswell and Mojduzska 1996). Mandatory labelling 
includes information such as the “use by” date or packaging date, the fat 
content and the origin of the food. As regards compulsory labelling, interest 
in this study is focused on the labelling of beef in general and information on 
the origin of beef in particular.   
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3.2 Formation of consumer perceptions of quality and 
risks 
 
3.2.1 Quality cues as basis for consumer quality evaluation 
 
As stated above in Chapter 3.1.1, buyers cannot evaluate all quality and 
safety characteristics merely on the basis of search attributes. Nor does ex-
perience necessarily indicate food safety and quality characteristics with a 
sufficient degree of certainty. Under conditions of imperfect quality informa-
tion, how then do consumers form their quality perceptions? 
 When evaluating the quality of food products, consumers must contend 
with various quality cues. Earlier studies have showed that consumers utilise 
quality cues such as the colour, fat content, place of purchase, appearance, 
absence of packaging and marination, and origin and brand (Bredahl 2003, 
Glitsch 2000, Grunert 1997, Järvelä 1998). 
 Consumer quality perception and decision-making processes have been 
studied in many ways, the most extensive of which has been the Total Food 
Quality Model (Grunert et al. 2004). This model combines several previous 
approaches to food quality, such as the means-end chain (Gutman 1982), 
the Fisbein-Ajzen attitude theory (1975), information economics (Nelson 
1974, Darby and Karni 1973), theories of reasoned action and planned be-
haviour, and expected and perceived quality (Oliver 1980, 1993). 
 As shown in Figure 1, Grunert et al. (2004) divided the food quality 
model into two main sections: consumer behaviour before purchase, and 
consumer behaviour after purchase. This classification was derived from in-
formation economics, where the consumer is able to detect some quality 
characteristics before buying. However, most quality characteristics can only 
be detected after buying, as described in Chapter 3.1.1. In the consumer 
choice process, expectations of quality are thus based on imperfect quality 
information, and the term ‘expected quality’ is therefore used. 
Expected quality consists of perceived quality cues. Consumers mainly base 
their perceptions of product quality on a limited number of quality cues, due 
to time constraints and individual quality information processing capabilities 
(Steenkamp 1989). Tiilikainen (1998) examines the associations between 
the quality attribute beliefs and perceived quality. According to Steenkamp 
(1989), quality cues are information that the consumer can receive and as-
certain before making buying decisions. Intrinsic quality cues are related to  
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Figure 1.    The Total Food Quality Model (Grunert et al. 2004). 
 
 
physical product characteristics such as the colour and fat content. Extrinsic 
quality cues are associated with the product, but they are not an integral 
part of the physical product itself, and they can be modified without altering 
the actual product. Extrinsic cues include information on properties such as 
the origin, production processes and pricing.  
 Table 2 merges search, experience and credence characteristics with 
extrinsic and intrinsic quality cues. Clearly, it is important to focus the provi-
sion of information on the most significant indicators of experience and cre-
dence quality cues. Consumer-oriented food chains should strive to convert 
these indicators into extrinsic cues. 
 
 
Technical
product
specifi-
cations
Intrinsic
quality
cues
Perceived
intrinsic
quality
cues
Expected
quality
•Taste
•Health
•Convenience
•Process
Expected
purchase
motive
fulfilment
Extrinsic
quality
cues
Cost
cues
Perceived
cost
cues
Perceived
costs
Intention
to buy
Meal
preparation
Perceived
extrinsic
quality
cues
Shopping situation
Eating
situation
Sensory
character-
istics
Future
purchase
Experienced
purchase
motive
fulfilment
Experienced
quality
•Taste
•Health
•Convenience
•Process
Before purchase After purchase
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Table 2.     Classification of quality cues 
 
 Intrinsic cues Extrinsic cues 
Search charac-
teristics 
 colour 
 texture 
 fat content 
 smell 
 food labels: 
- nutritional facts (label) 
- origin (label) 
- brand 
- organic food label 
- price 
- “use by” date 
- packaging date 
 packaging 
Experience 
characteristics 
 taste 
 freshness 
 tenderness 
 acute foodborne ill-
nesses 
 
Credence char-
acteristics 
 chronic foodborne 
illnesses 
 nutritional charac-
teristics 
 process characteris-
tics 
 
 
 
Grunert et al. (2004) stated that in the purchase situation, buyers compare 
expected quality and buying motives with monetary costs. In economics, the 
comparison of benefits and costs is called a trade-off. The trade-off situation 
determines the intention to buy. After purchase, consumers acquire quality 
experience through food preparation and usage. The experienced quality is 
influenced by various factors such as the product itself and its sensory char-
acteristics, but also the way the food was prepared, as well as situational 
factors such as the time of day, type of meal, and the consumer’s mood and 
previous experiences (Grunert et al. 2004). The relationship between quality 
expectations and quality experience (e.g., before and after purchase) is 
commonly believed to determine product satisfaction, and consequently the 
probability of repeated purchases. 
 Consumer perceptions of quality are an outcome of a process that in-
volves many different phases. Bernués et al. (2003) built a conceptual model 
that describes the formation of consumer quality perception as a synthesis of 
quality supply, consumer perception of and demand for quality (Figure 2). 
The model reproduces the above-mentioned quality formation process based 
on actual and perceived quality cues  and  the  integration of  these beliefs in 
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Figure 2.  The supply, perception of and demand for food quality (Bernués 
et al. 2003). 
 
 
the evaluation of total quality. Similarly to Grunert’s (1997) model, buying 
and experience processes are divided, and the expected quality is thereby 
differentiated from the experienced quality and credence quality. In this 
model, the preparation of food is an essential part of the formation of ex-
perienced quality. 
 Becker (2000) highlighted the supply of quality cues and added the food 
industry into the model. This brought into focus the fact that it is possible for 
the operators in the food chain to influence the supply of quality cues pro-
vided to consumers. The model underlined the development of consumer-
oriented quality in the food chain as well as the dynamic process of the for-
mation of consumer quality perceptions. 
 
Quality cues in meat products 
 
The next chapter clarifies the formation of the consumer quality perception 
of meat products and the use of quality cues related to beef products in par-
ticular. Grunert (1997) found that consumers generally observe the quality 
of meat through various quality cues, such as the colour, aroma, “use by” 
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date, cut of meat, display hygiene, packaging, price, weight, conspicuous 
bones/veins, deep-frozen or fresh, marbling, visible fat, fat content, and the 
colour and consistency of fat. Since a time limit is present in the buying 
process, two factors appeared to dominate the formation of expected qual-
ity: perceived fat and the place of purchase. In other words, by choosing a 
given place of purchase, the consumers show trust in a specific meat seller 
or foodstore that is believed to recognise high quality meat. 
 In Finland, we still have only a few distinct quality cues in meat prod-
ucts that indicate credence quality and safety. Meat products are mainly 
bought from store shelves or meat counters without distinct quality labels. 
However, the use and recognition of quality brands is increasing. 
 If there are no distinct recognisable quality labels on the market, the 
price of the product can be regarded as a quality cue according to Monroe 
and Krishnan (1985). However, as a consequence, manufacturers may have 
no intentions and financial incentives to increase quality information on the 
market, if the product price loses its meaning as a quality cue. This may be a 
further reason for the failure of the markets to produce enough quality in-
formation. 
 Another paradox may occur if quality is too difficult for the consumers 
to observe. Vertanen (2001) found that in the Finnish meat chain, quality 
information is transmitted quite smoothly all the way to the purchasing 
agents at the store level, but the flow of information breaks just before con-
sumer level. When the quality and safety differences between products are 
highlighted too strongly, consumers may question the quality of meat and, in 
extreme cases, completely reject meat products (Kola et al. 2003). 
 
Safety-related quality cues 
 
Among quality cues, safety is clearly a credence characteristic, which makes 
it especially difficult for consumers to estimate. Henson and Northern (2000) 
studied the process by which consumers assessed the safety of beef at the 
point of purchase in six EU countries. They found that at the point of pur-
chase, information on animal feed, the country of origin and freshness were 
regarded as the most useful indicators of the safety of beef. In the UK and 
Sweden, a brand/quality assurance label was ranked higher than in the other 
countries involved in the study. In general, the price of the product and the 
name of the producer were not considered as good indicators of the safety of 
beef. Many studies indicate that the origin of beef is an important indicator 
of product safety for consumers (Bernués et al. 2003, Henson and Northern 
2000, Glitsch 2000). 
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 According to Becker (2000), credence quality characteristics in food 
products can be crystallised as the following list of attributes: hormones, 
antibiotics, fat/cholesterol, Salmonella, and, in beef, BSE. If information on 
these attributes is not available to the consumers at the point of purchase, 
they must rely on information from other communication channels, such as 
other people and the media. 
 Järvelä (1998) stated that for Finnish consumers, food safety is valuable 
in itself or as an intrinsic value, and consumers mainly perceive it through 
the purity and freshness of meat. In the consumers’ minds, freshness is 
linked with the slaughter of animals, the storage times of meat, and whether 
or not the meat is packaged. With unpacked meat, consumers assess the 
origin and texture of the meat, and their trust in the seller of the meat in the 
store. With packaged meat, consumers can easily deduce its freshness from 
the packaging and “use by” dates. When prioritising safety aspects, consum-
ers base their selection on criteria such as the domestic origin as well as the 
unpackaged and unmarinated state of the meat. Visual appearance and la-
bels also help Finnish consumers to choose safe meat. 
 
 
3.2.2 Risk and information 
 
When a consumer is choosing food and estimating its safety in a store, in-
formation on its risks and their precise statistical probabilities is rarely, if 
ever, available. Therefore, consumer information on the risks is mainly 
based on hearsay and personal experiences. 
 The consumer decision process involves risk when the consumer cannot 
anticipate consequences with certainty, and some of the consequences are 
likely to be unpleasant (Bauer 1960). From the viewpoint of an individual, it 
is a question of perceived risk. Perceived risk can be divided into two con-
cepts: uncertainty about the true probabilities and harmful consequences 
(Cunningham 1967). Consumer risk can also vary depending on whether it is 
related to a specific product category or a specific product (Bettman 1973, 
Dowling and Staelin 1994). The third essential definition of risk is that of ac-
ceptable risk for a given product (Kahnemann et al. 1982, Dowling and 
Staelin 1994). 
 The theoretical model of Dowling and Staeling (1994) is described be-
low. The model formulated consumer risk perception and its effects on con-
sumer risk-handling behaviour such as information search. The theoretical 
element of this paradigm is motivating from the viewpoint of this study, 
since it merges two frameworks: Bettman’s (1979) study of consumer in-
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formation processing on the one hand, and Stigler’s model (1961) of infor-
mation search on the other. The latter was introduced in Chapter 3.1.2. 
This model consists of three components: 
(I) The factors affecting consumer risk perception; 
(II) Perception of risks concerning specific products and product 
categories; and 
(III) The impact of these risk components on consumer information 
search behaviour. 
 Figure 3 describes how and in which order these concepts affect con-
sumer risk perception and risk reduction activities. 
 The initial point in the risk perception model is that the consumer first 
decides to evaluate a product in a known product category, along with fac-
tors that are relevant for the usage situation in relation to purchase motives, 
as well as any previous information on the product. The overall perceived 
risk consists of these factors. In this model, risk is classified into so-called 
inherent and handled risk factors (Bettman 1973). 
 Bettman (1973) stated that: “Inherent risk is the latent risk a producer 
class hold for a consumer – the innate degree of conflict the product class 
hold for a consumer. Handled risk is the amount of conflict the product class 
is able to arouse when the buyer chooses a brand from a product class in his 
usual buying situation. That is, handled risk to a first approximation repre-
sents the end result of the action of information and risk reduction process 
on inherent risk.” The first term refers then to the manner in which the con-
sumer looks at the risk within a specific product category, and therefore the 
term ‘product category risk’ is used. The latter term refers to product specific 
risks when a buyer chooses a specific brand in a purchase situation. The risk 
concept is therefore termed ‘product specific risk’ (SR). If information is not 
available, these two concepts do not differ from each other (Bettman 1973). 
 Consumer risk perception is affected by many factors that vary from 
one situation to another. Often, these factors are related to the purchase 
situation and are also product specific. As an example, Dowling and Staelin 
(1994) mentioned the following: 
(I)  Product specific attributes such as quality and price; 
(II)  The likelihood of harmful consequences of purchase; 
(III)  Buying motives; and 
(IV)  Situational factors such as the place of purchase. 
 In this model, the essential component is the term ‘acceptable risk’ 
(AR). An acceptable risk can be of two types, namely the product category 
and a specific product. There is a connection between these two categories: 
if a consumer accepts a high product category risk, it also lowers the accept-
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able risk for a specific product. To reduce the level of a risk in a purchase 
situation, consumers perform risk-reduction strategies such as information 
search. 
 In this model, acceptable risk determines the extent to which risk-
reduction activities are made to support decision-making. In a conventional 
situation where the acceptable risk is higher than a product-specific risk 
(SR < AR), the consumer routinely conducts normal information search ac-
tivities. In this case, the consumer accepts the level of risk and does not col-
lect any extra information. If the level of risk is unacceptable (SR > AR), the 
consumer will undertake extra risk-reduction strategies in order to reduce a 
risk. The model is dynamic in the sense that the information may change the 
risk perception. 
 
• Purchased Goals
• Intended Usage
• Prior Knowledge
• Involvement (ego, product, purchase)
Overall Perceived Risk
Product
Specific
Risk
Product
Class
Risk
Normal Search
Completed and
SR < AR?
STOP
SEARCH
Ability to
Suffer Loss
Acceptable Risk
Perceived
Cost of
Search
Perceived
Benefit of
Search
”Extra” ”Normal”
”Search”
YES
NO
 
 
Figure 3.  Conceptual model of the perceived risk and information search 
process (Dowling and Staelin 1994). 
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Risk reduction strategies are divided into two categories, of which the first is 
connected with a normal search for information on a given product in order 
to acquire general product class information. The second strategy is used to 
reduce a specific perceived risk related to a particular product to an accept-
able level. This might be achieved by collecting new information on the 
brand or other available brands, or by modifying the range of products in the 
choice set. 
 The likelihood of loss can be affected by obtaining information from a 
friend who has used the product, limiting the set of alternatives to well-
known brands, or by testing the product prior to purchase. Alternatively, the 
magnitude of harmful consequences may be reduced by altering the pur-
chase goals, or “insuring” against any adverse purchase by choosing a more 
expensive product (Dowling and Staelin 1994). The trade-off between the 
benefits and costs of risk reduction activities finally determines the extent of 
information search activities. 
 Studies have shown that in addition to package labelling, consumers 
use various information sources such as internal and external memory 
(Bettman 1979). Internal memory mainly arises from the consumer’s own 
experience. External memory refers to the information obtained by listening 
to other people’s experiences, or through the media. Becker (2000) stated 
that if not enough information is available on credence characteristics, con-
sumers must use other information channels, such as acquaintances and the 
media. 
 Järvelä (1998) found that in Finland, personal negative experiences dis-
tinctly impact future purchases. In addition, such experiences are very easily 
shared with other consumers. This means that reports of negative experi-
ences spread out and affect the buying behaviour of other consumers as 
well. According to Järvelä (1998), the role of the media is more likely to 
cause fear than to satisfy the consumers’ informational needs. 
 
Perception of risks concerning beef products 
 
In Europe, a constantly growing number of studies have investigated the use 
of quality cues and consumer risk perception in beef products. Henson and 
Northern (2000) stated that the consumers’ perceived ability to assess risks 
associated with beef will affect their risk perception; the more influential is 
the perceived ability to evaluate quality in the purchase situation, the 
smaller is the risk perceived by the consumers in that situation. Another 
finding was that the more experienced the consumer was, the smaller was 
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the perceived risk. Based on earlier literature, McCarthy and Henson (2005) 
summarised the most important determinants for perceived risk as follows: 
- the consumer’s perceived ability to assess the risks of beef 
products; 
- interest in food preparation and beef; 
- perceived product consistency; 
- perceived confidence in the purchase location; and 
- experience. 
 Consumers use various ways to reduce the risks involved in food 
purchase situations. McCarthy and Henson (2005) listed various risk 
reduction strategies in beef products. In order of importance, they are: 
purchase location, colour of the meat, country of origin, quality labels, fat 
content, label information, price, smell, texture and information on the 
butcher.  
 In their study, they divided respondents into three consumer segments 
according to perceived risk: sceptical (33%), cagey (53%) and optimistic 
(14%). A common trait of all these groups was that the choice of purchase 
place was a significant factor as a risk reliever. There were also significant 
differences in the use of risk relievers across the three segments. The scep-
tics perceived the highest risk in beef, and they were sceptical about their 
own ability to assess the quality of meat. In addition, this group used the 
highest number and most varied ways to reduce the level of perceived risk in 
beef. According to McCarthy and Henson (2005), the use of a single source 
of information such as a quality label may not be sufficient. Instead, multiple 
risk relievers are required. 
 
 
3.2.3 Willingness to pay for safety and quality cues in meat 
products 
 
Latouche et al. (1998) employed the contingent valuation method to study 
consumer willingness to pay for beef that would not transmit CJD to humans. 
Their question format was a mix of the bidding process and referendum 
method. To avoid the pitfalls of both methods, a new procedure for the im-
plementation of the iterative bidding WTP question was introduced. The sur-
veyor proposes an interval of monetary values instead of a precise amount. 
This interval is varied systematically across the sample according to the dis-
tribution of the WTP obtained in the pre-test study. The respondents answer 
“yes” if their WTP belongs to the interval and “no” if it does not. 
 29 
 The survey elicited 658 usable responses. In the survey, the primary 
grocery shopper in the family was interviewed, and therefore 65% of re-
spondents were women. Willingness to pay was estimated for two different 
goods: meat posing a slight possible risk, such as minced steak; and sup-
posedly risk-free high-quality beef. The quality was associated with the 
price: the slightly riskier and cheaper meat cost €7.62 (FF50) /kg, while the 
supposedly risk-free high quality beef was more expensive and cost 
€15.24 (FF100) /kg. 
 The results showed that in the case of the cheaper beef, 24% of the 
respondents did not want to pay anything. Even the last of the six proposed 
intervals elicited approximately 100 answers. The distribution indicates a 
large number of respondents in the highest class of bid, which suggests that 
the fat-tail problem had not fully been overcome. 
 The calculations produced an average willingness to pay value of 
€1.69 /kg, including zero bids. For high-quality beef, the zero responses rep-
resented about 29% of the total sample. The mean WTP reached €2.08 
(FF 13.66), including zero bids. The explanatory model of the willingness to 
pay was tested using the parametric choice model by Hanemann (1984). The 
logit model had a low explanatory power (R2 = 6%). However, the adopted 
iterative bidding procedure did not resolve the starting bid bias. The results 
obtained by Latouche et al. (1998) clearly showed that there is demand for 
safer beef products, of which the 14% and 22% additional willingness to pay 
values were concrete proof. 
 Enneking (2004) studied consumer WTP for quality and safety labels. 
The research data consisted of 321 interviews conducted during February 
and March 2002 in northern Germany. As the method of research, the choice 
experiment was applied to the analysed choice situation between various 
brands and quality and safety labels. According to the results, consumers are 
willing to pay approximately 20% more if the product carries a quality as-
surance label or, in other words, a third party has guaranteed the quality 
and safety of the product. The empirical findings suggested that quality la-
belling significantly influences the consumer choice process. The results also 
showed a wide variation in WTP estimates, indicating considerable prefer-
ence heterogeneity across the respondents. One conclusion was that the 
magnitude of WTP varies across brands: for a known premium brand the 
WTP was €0.34 /kg (the price of the meat product was about €1.6 – 1.7). 
However, the WTP for the lower priced product remained at only €0.11 /kg. 
The study confirmed that the idea of quality and safety labels as relievers of 
information asymmetry in the food chain depends on the position of a given 
brand in the consumer choice process. For the sellers of the meat, this 
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means that not only can they rely on a third party certification, but they can 
also build trust by branding their products. 
 Loureiro and Umbergen (2007) also utilised a choice experiment in their 
study. The aim of the study was to explore the preferences of US consumers 
regarding food safety, country of origin labelling and traceability. A postal 
survey was conducted in spring 2003. A total of 632 acceptable responses 
were received, which translated to a response rate as low as 13%. In the 
survey, the respondents had to choose between two types of beef rib eye 
steaks and a “no choice” option. In this method, the choice set was repeated 
several times, and therefore the total number of responses was 3,530. 
 The results indicated that the label certifying the steak as inspected by 
the USDA food safety inspectors carried the highest premium of €16.40 /kg 
($8.068 per pound5 of steak). For other quality attributes, WTP was clearly 
lower: €5.22 /kg for the country of origin, €3.86 /kg for traceability, and 
€1.94 / kg for quality attributes. The researchers stated that although these 
WTP values were unlikely to be realised on the markets as such, they did 
point out the consumers’ order of preference. Other studies (Dickinson and 
Bailey 2002, Hobbs 2003) have also come to similar conclusions: consumers 
value the most a certification that indicates safe food. 
 
 
3.2.4 Trust in the suppliers of information in Finland 
 
Traditionally, public authorities and institutions responsible for the control of 
food safety have enjoyed consumer trust in Finland. For example, the BSE 
crisis caused no hysteria among Finnish consumers, and its consequences for 
beef demand were much more moderate than in southern Europe. In spring 
2006, the demand for poultry dropped by 50% in Italy, while the respective 
shift was merely 15% in Germany, and only a few percent in Finland (PTT 
Katsaus 2006). Below, the study of Piiroinen el al. (2004) is introduced as a 
context for the discussion of consumer trust in the providers of information 
in Finland. The study focuses on the Finnish consumer opinions on food 
safety and trust in the stakeholders of the food chain. 
 The foundations of consumer trust are societal and cultural in nature. In 
addition to various actors, institutions, production, distribution and consump-
tion, they are also affected by the prevailing beliefs and perceptions. For the 
consumers, it is crucial to have confidence in the actors tasked with risk as-
                                                     
5 One pound corresponds to 0.453 kilograms. In April 2003, the exchange rate 
between the Euro and US Dollar was 1.08. 
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sessment and risk handling activities. It is important to note that consumer 
trust is grounded in trust in people, i.e. human actors, instead of concepts, 
such as food safety. 
 Among other things, Piiroinen et al. (2004) investigated whether Finnish 
consumers trust in the safety of the food they buy and consume. With this 
question, they wanted to clarify consumer perceptions about the functioning 
of the markets. According to their results, Finnish consumers seemed rather 
confident, as 59% of the consumers indicated a high degree of trust in the 
safety of food. However, 40% of Finnish consumers indicated uncertainty 
about food safety. Only 1%  of the respondents  stated  that  they  had  very 
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Figure 4. The importance of quality and safety factors in the beef pur-
chasing situation (Piiroinen et al. 2004). 
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little trust in the safety of food. In the study, some socio-demographic dif-
ferences could be found. For example, women were more sceptical than 
men, and the more educated the respondents were, the more they trusted in 
the safety of food. However, the size of the family or the number of children 
did not affect consumer trust. 
 Trust in food varies across different types of food. Regarding the safety 
of beef in Finland, the two most important factors for the respondents were 
strict meat safety requirements together with monitoring and control actions 
carried out by the municipal food control authorities. In third place, the con-
sumers ranked good product information on beef products (Figure 4). It 
seems that consumers in Finland regard trust in different systems and regu-
lations as a crucial element in building trust in the safety of food, while per-
sonal trust in the suppliers of meat has a minor role. Older people seem to 
value personal trust in shopkeepers more than younger people. 
 It can be stated that the level of confidence in food in Finland is high, as 
six consumers out of ten trust in the safety of the food available in stores. 
This confidence in the safety of food seems to depend on a more general 
sense of personal security and confidence. Finns are relatively trusting com-
pared to other European consumers. In the event of food scandals, Finns 
have more trust in the credibility of the information provided by the various 
actors in the food chain. On average, Finns also consider that food quality 
has improved and regard many foods as safer than consumers in other simi-
larly surveyed countries (Piiroinen et al. 2004). 
 
 
3.3 Research hypotheses for consumer willingness to pay 
 
Based on the theoretical frameworks described above, we may deduce that 
perfect information on the quality and safety of food products is not available 
on the food market, and therefore consumer choice is based on quality cues. 
Information on the quality of food is thus imperfect and may be divided 
asymmetrically between the various actors in the food chain. It may be im-
perfect because contamination related to some risk factors may occur along 
the whole food chain. From these theoretical frameworks, the following hy-
potheses can be deduced: 
Hypothesis I 
 If there is not enough quality information on the food mar-
ket, consumers are willing to pay for it and thus indicate 
gaining utility from increased quality information. 
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 As goods, quality information and food safety are public goods and 
they cannot be priced using the pricing mechanism in the food 
chain. This fact validates the choice of the contingent valuation 
method for the valuation of these market imperfections. 
 In the food quality policy, one option is to use information guidance 
or remedy. This method then measures the benefits of this policy 
change through consumer willingness to pay. Changes in the con-
sumer utility function and the valuation of these changes in welfare 
theory are discussed in Chapter 4. 
Hypothesis II 
 The higher the risk a consumer associates with food prod-
ucts, the greater is the value increase and willingness to pay 
for quality information. 
 In the food market, food safety has become an increasingly signifi-
cant characteristic after many food crises. The consumer perception 
of risk affects the search for information on the product. Therefore, 
risk is one explanatory factor for consumer willingness to pay for 
quality information. 
Hypothesis III 
 Personal and other people’s negative experiences concern-
ing food quality affect willingness to pay for quality informa-
tion. 
 Finnish consumers trust in the actors of the food chain. The crucial 
element is that the quality information is credible and consumers 
can utilise it in their decision-making process. If there is a lack of 
reliable information, consumers make decisions based on personal 
and other people’s experiences. In this study, these factors are util-
ised to explain consumer willingness to pay for quality information. 
Hypothesis IV 
 Trust in the providers of food quality information affects 
consumer willingness to pay for quality information. 
 Finnish consumers trust in the actors of the food chain. However, 
this trust may diminish the willingness to pay for increased quality 
information. As a consequence, consumers may consider it as their 
duty to search for additional information, while this should not be 
left for the consumers to pay. 
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4 CONSUMER WELFARE CHANGES AND THEIR 
VALUATION 
 
 
As stated in Chapter 3, the insufficiency of food quality information forces 
consumers to base their assessment of the quality of food products merely 
on various quality cues. Insufficient information on food safety, both asym-
metric and incomplete, thereby has an impact on consumer welfare. This 
chapter presents the theoretical framework derived from welfare economics 
that was used for the monetary valuation of consumer welfare. 
 An essential idea in welfare economics is Pareto improvement, or more 
efficient allocation of societal resources. Chapter 4.1 utilises welfare econom-
ics to explore consumer welfare changes and willingness to pay. Because 
utility cannot be measured using direct, empirical metrics, an alternative 
way of measuring utility is required. The intensity of consumer preferences 
between various options can be determined through consumer willingness to 
pay (Just et al. 1982). At the end of Chapter 4.2, willingness to pay is de-
fined using the concepts of compensating variation and equivalent variation. 
 
 
4.1 Marshallian demand function and consumer surplus 
 
Assume that the individual demand function is U = U(x,q), where x = x1… xm 
is the vector for a private good and  q = q1… qn is the vector for a public 
good. This means that individuals can affect the consumed amount of x, 
whereas q is exogenic, or provided from the outside. For example, in this 
study, individual beef-buyers are unable to control the quality of particular 
foodstuffs and the contents of quality information. Further, assume that the 
price range for x is p1… pm = p. Individuals maximise utility in proportion to 
their income y, whereby the consumer utility maximisation problem can be 
formulated as follows: 
 
(4.1) yxpqxuuxam iix  ),(  
The solution to the consumer utility maximisation problem is the Marshallian 
demand function. The demand function expresses the demand xi for a given 
good as the function of income y and amount of public good q. 
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The demand function allows a comparison of consumer welfare changes us-
ing the concept of so-called consumer surplus (Just et al. 1982). In a graphi-
cal form, consumer surplus manifests as a triangle bounded by the demand 
curve, market price and amount of a given good. Consumer surplus occurs 
when consumer willingness to pay exceeds the market price. Empirical 
measurement of consumer surplus using a Marshallian demand curve be-
comes problematic if several price and/or income changes are simultane-
ously brought under examination (Johansson 1993). 
 The problems in measuring consumer surplus can be addressed using 
an indirect utility function. The indirect utility function (V) expresses the 
maximum individual utility u for prices p and amount of public good q (Haab 
and McConnell 2002). 
 
(4.3)   yxpqxuyqpV
x
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Assume that a change occurs in the supply of a public good, while the prices 
of all other goods and individual income levels are expected to remain un-
changed. 
 
(4.4)  ),,(),,( 01 qypVqypVV  , 
 
where the superscript 0 denotes the original state and 1 denotes the final 
state for the change occurring for a public good. Assume next that the indi-
vidual considers the change as an improvement over the present state. 
However, in some cases the individual may consider the change indifferent, 
where its value is zero, or the individual may even consider the change as a 
deterioration of the present situation (negative willingness to pay). For ex-
ample, in this study, vegetarians may have perceived that increasing the 
amount and availability of beef quality information is irrelevant from their 
point of view. 
 Because utility cannot be measured empirically, monetary valuation of 
welfare effects caused by changes in public goods must be performed using 
an inverted expenditure function calculated from the indirect utility function. 
The expenditure function determines the minimum expenditure required to 
achieve a given utility function. 
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By differentiating the expenditure function with respect to price, a so-called 
compensating or Hicksian demand function is obtained: 
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4.2 The concepts of compensating variation and 
equivalent variation 
 
In the monetary valuation of welfare effects, the most central concepts are 
those of compensating variation and equivalent variation, introduced by John 
R. Hicks6. The supply of a public good may either increase or decline; how-
ever, this chapter focuses solely on the welfare changes caused by an in-
crease in the supply of a public good. 
 Compensating variation (CV) is a given quantity of money, where: 
 
(4.7)  ),,(),,( 01 qypVqCVypV   
 
Thus, compensating variation is the maximal quantity of money that can be 
taken away from the consumer while allowing the consumer to remain on 
the same utility level as before the change. In other words, CV denotes con-
sumer willingness to pay for an increased supply of a given good.  
Equivalent variation (EV) is the most minimal quantity of money provided to 
the consumer in order to maintain a level of utility similar to that after an 
improvement has taken place. 
 
(4.8)  ),,(),,( 10 qypVqEVypV   
 
The above-mentioned welfare quantities can also be calculated in the case of 
a private good. In this study, willingness to pay for quality information is 
determined through changes in prices of a private good, beef. By increasing 
the price of a private good while assuming no changes in other prices and 
income levels, it is possible to determine the change in consumer surplus for 
                                                     
6 In the 1940s, John R. Hicks (1904-1989) published several articles on consumer 
surplus in the Review of Economic Studies series. 
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an increase in the amount of a public good. In the case of an increased pub-
lic good, this change can be calculated as a compensated variation as follows 
(Johansson 1993): 
 
(4.9) 
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The underlying assumption is that except for the private good (x1) and public 
good (q1) under observation, all other prices are excluded from considera-
tion. Households are expected to remain at the original level of utility 
through compensating variation (CV(p1)). In the formula, the term on the 
right denotes the original, income-compensated demand function in the 
original situation, while the term on the left denotes the situation after the 
change. In Figure 5, the shaded area describes the demand change as the 
supply of the public good q1 is increased. In the Figure, the Hicksian demand 
functions are shown with cx1 . 
 
Figure 5.  Monetary change caused by a policy change, in the case of a 
public good (Johansson 1993). 
 
Equivalent and compensated welfare changes are often expressed using the 
concepts of willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA). Willing-
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ness to pay is a meaningful concept in conditions where economic operators 
wish to acquire more of a particular good. Willingness to accept is an appro-
priate concept in conditions where economic operators are requested to vol-
untarily give up a particular good. Rights of ownership determine which con-
cept is the more applicable; if the operator possesses neither the given good 
nor its rights of ownership, the case at hand is that of willingness to pay 
(Carson 2000). 
 The next chapter examines the contingent valuation method used for 
measuring the welfare changes described above, as well as the operationali-
sation of consumer willingness to pay. 
 
 
4.3 The contingent valuation method 
 
Traditionally, economic consumer studies have been based on the exchange 
of goods on the markets, making observations of consumer buying behav-
iour through prices and purchase volumes. However, traditional demand 
analyses cannot measure changes occurring in food safety or information, or 
their utility effects on the consumers, because these attributes are not di-
rectly apparent in food prices. On the markets, food safety generates neither 
price nor value in its own right. Therefore, the economic value of food safety 
can be determined through costs of illnesses, pricing differences between 
products, or consumer willingness to pay studies. 
 In the cost of illness method, the values to be calculated are ex post 
values. This method calculates the magnitude of costs caused by treatment 
of illnesses, income losses and production losses. The greatest advantage of 
the cost of illness method is its ability to draw on relatively readily available 
statistical data. In addition, sensitivity studies on the changes in the various 
cost categories can be performed. However, the cost of illness method is 
considered a rough economic barometer, because it ignores economic values 
expressed by individuals, such as those concerning their health. Thus, the 
method does not fit within the concept of utility as defined in economic the-
ory, and it underestimates real social utility (Buzby et al. 1996). 
 Hedonic price analysis measures utility through the market-based ex-
change of goods. The hedonic price method is applicable when food products 
with apparent food safety attributes are sold on the markets. For example, 
by studying differences in the market prices of conventional and organic food 
products, it is possible to obtain an estimated price for consumer apprecia-
tion of pesticide and herbicide free products. However, safety attributes, es-
pecially those of food, cannot often be explicitly determined, and thus no 
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data are available for the application of this method. The purpose of the he-
donic price method is to identify the safety attributes of a given product and 
set them apart from its other attributes. In the valuation of the various 
product attributes, especially for novel products, conjoint analysis can also 
be used (e.g., Baker 1999, Halbrendt et al. 1995). However, the application 
of price analysis calls for objectively measurable product qualities (Jensen 
and Basiotis 1993). In terms of food safety, attributes are not directly ob-
servable. Research data might consist of studying the preventive measures 
taken by consumers (e.g., longer cooking times when preparing meals). Ob-
taining such data requires a survey designed specifically for that purpose. 
 Another research method that measures consumer utility is the contin-
gent valuation (CV) method. CV is the most frequently used method in food 
safety studies. As a research method, CV requires a survey where the re-
spondents are queried on the amounts of money they would be willing to 
pay for the provision of a public good, such as reduced health risks (e.g. 
Henson 1996): The difficulty with this method lies in the framing of the 
questions concerning non-priced goods on hypothetical markets.  
 In recent years, another method besides CV used for studying food at-
tributes has been the choice experiment (CE) method. Choice experiments 
(CEs) have been employed in the marketing, transportation and psychology 
literature for some time (Louviere 1988, Hensner 1994). They arose from 
conjoint analysis which is commonly used in marketing and transportation 
research. Choice experiments differ from typical conjoint methods in that 
individuals are asked to choose from alternative bundles of attributes instead 
of ranking or rating them (Adamowicz et al. 1998).   
 Adamowicz et al. (1998) also states that the CE method appears to 
have several advantages relative to the CV method. He argues that CE is 
based on attributes that allow the researcher to value the attributes as well 
as situational changes. This method has become increasingly prevalent in 
studies on food quality and safety during the last couple of years, e.g., En-
neking (2004) and Alfnes (2004). 
 Experimental auctions have also been applied in utility valuations. Com-
pared with the CV method, an experimental auction provides the researcher 
with much greater control over the experimental conditions, respondents’ 
expenditure and data obtained (Jensen and Basiotis 1993). Concerning food 
safety, experimental auctions have been used to study subjects such as con-
sumer willingness to pay for food irradiation (Fox et al. 1995, Fox et al. 
2002, Shogren et al. 1999) and for hormone-free beef (Alfnes and Rickert-
sen 2003). 
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 Lee and Hatcher (2000) consider CV as the best method for the cases 
where the good to be valued is information related to specific attributes of a 
given good. The CV method provides enough elasticity to analyse specific 
policies and to measure WTP for an attribute or quality change. Frequently, 
researchers must fall back on the CV method because the type of data re-
quired by other methods is not available. This was the main justification for 
the factors contributing to the decision to apply the CV method in this case 
study. In this study, the CE method was considered inapplicable due to 
insufficient knowledge of the most relevant attributes; it is risky for a 
researcher to fix the measurements to only a few attributes. This is 
especially relevant regarding studies where there is no information available 
from previous research on these attributes and their significance in the 
consumer choice process. Therefore, CE would be more relevant when a 
researcher can make use of previous literature on applicable attributes in a 
straightforward choice situation. The original research plan of the study 
included the use of experimental auctions. However, due to the reduction of 
the research grant, this part of the study had to be excluded.  
 The CV method used to measure consumer willingness to pay has re-
ceived a great deal of criticism. Specifically, criticism has been levelled at the 
basic assumption of this method: that the respondents are capable of com-
paring the various options, and estimating both utility changes and eventual 
utility in monetary terms. What has been considered particularly problematic 
is the monetary valuation of nature and living creatures. The method has 
been further criticised for its so-called hypothetical bias, or the fact that in 
reality, consumers would not actually be willing to pay the amounts of 
money they indicated during the study. The solutions to the problems of va-
lidity and reliability of the CV method will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4.4. 
  In the willingness to pay question of a CV-based study, the first task is 
to describe to the respondents in the greatest possible detail the good to be 
valuated and the changes the good is to undergo. The next step consists of 
the presentation of the actual valuation question. The method incorporates 
various questioning techniques, including open questions, repeated bids and 
auctions, payment cards and single-bound or double-bound dichotomic ques-
tions. There are also other ways to formulate valuation questions; e.g., 
Mitchell and Carson (1989) list nine different questioning techniques. 
 The data elicited by the various questions can be divided into three 
categories: 
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(1)  continuously variable data, where the respondents name specific 
amounts of money in response to the question “What is the maxi-
mum price you would be willing to pay?” 
(2)  binary, dichotomic data, where the respondents may respond 
“Yes” or “No” to the proposed prices, in response to the question 
“Would you be willing to pay X euros?” 
(3)  interval data, where willingness to pay is known to fall within a 
given price range. Interval data can be elicited with varying ques-
tioning techniques, such as the presentation of several bids (dou-
ble-bound dichotomic auction), or all intervals simultaneously (a 
variant of the payment card technique). 
 
 
4.3.1 Operationalisation of willingness to pay 
 
This study explores consumer utility in the case of increased information on 
food quality and safety. Willingness to pay measures this utility in monetary 
terms. As willingness to pay increases, utility obtained from information can 
be also assumed to increase. Thus, willingness to pay also reflects the inten-
sity of the utility. 
 First, the respondents were asked to give their views on the construc-
tion of a quality data system; the purpose was to unambiguously identify the 
provider of information. It has been found that when respondents are able to 
express their opinions without monetary valuations, the reliability of the will-
ingness to pay question is increased (Blamey et al. 1999). The following 
general description of the construction of the quality data system was incor-
porated into the survey: 
In Finland, the stakeholders in the food chain (producers, food proc-
essing industry, retail sector, consumers and public authorities) have 
agreed on common goals through which attributes related to the qual-
ity and safety of Finnish food can be demonstrated to the consumers. 
More information on food quality and safety will be communicated to 
the consumers using a quality information system which is currently 
under development. Do you believe that such quality information as 
described above, produced by all stakeholders in the food chain, cre-
ates added value for Finnish food (= benefit to consumers)? 
 Next, the actual scenario on willingness to pay was outlined. The pur-
pose of the scenario was to describe the proposed political action and the 
consequent changes occurring in the supply of the good to be valuated. 
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Information on the beef labelling system 
The labelling system used in Finland allows beef to be traced back to 
the farm and animal it came from. The labelling process begins when a 
calf is born, with the insertion of yellow eartags in both ears. The 
eartag carries an individual bovine ID that stays with the animal for its 
whole lifetime. The owner reports the details of an eartagged calf to 
the bovine register, which is maintained by the public authorities. The 
sale of an animal from one farm to another is always reported to the 
register. The last report made by the owner specifies the slaughter-
house to which the animal was sent. On one eartag, the animal carries 
a number that allows the tracing of information on its feeding and pos-
sible illnesses and medication. The bovine ID follows the carcass in the 
slaughterhouse, and all the way to the store. 
What does the beef labelling system mean to the consumer? Through 
the labelling system, the consumers can be given information on the 
animal from which the beef was produced. Before buying beef, the 
consumer could also receive information on the feeding and any medi-
cation given to the animal, on animal welfare, and on aspects related 
to the environmental impact of the production process. In terms of 
food safety, it would mean information on quality control, and on the 
safety of Finnish beef. 
 After the scenario, the willingness to pay questions were posed to the 
respondents. In the typical dichotomic question format, the respondents 
must make simultaneous decisions on (I) whether they are willing to pay 
anything at all for the proposed action, and (II) how much would they be 
willing to pay. In the survey form, this decision-making related problem was 
addressed by means of a two-staged willingness to pay question: the re-
spondents were first queried whether they had any willingness to pay at all, 
whereafter the bids were proposed to the respondents who indicated positive 
willingness to pay. 
 The respondents who indicated positive willingness to pay by responding 
“Yes” to the first question were offered bids that were randomly drawn from 
the  range  €0.34-2.69  (FIM  2-167).   Then, a  second  willingness  to  pay  
 
 
                                                     
7 At the time this study was conducted in 2000, the currency of Finland was the 
Finnish Mark (FIM, markka). Finland changed over to using euro banknotes and coins 
on 1 January 2002. The Finnish Mark was used until 28 February 2002. One euro 
corresponds to 5.94573 Finnish Marks. 
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Binary model
First Valuation Question:
Would you be willing to pay for the creation
and maintenance of an information system
that provided you with better information on 
the origin, production method and safety of 
beef? 
Response
’No’
Response
’Yes’
• Motives for 
unwillingness to pay 
• Exclusion of protest
responses
Dichotomic Valuation Question
• Single bids between
FIM 2-16 (EUR 0.34-2.66)
• Yes/no response
• Parametric logit and probit
estimation and non-parametric
estimation
Binary logistic model
Motives affecting willingness to pay
Interval Valuation Question
• The interval question was not
modelled in this study
 
 
Figure 6.     Willingness to pay questions in this study. 
 
 
question was presented with the following willingness to pay intervals: 
maximum €0.34 per kg; €1.01-1.18 /kg; €1.35-1.68 /kg; €1.85-2.02 /kg; 
€2.19-2.52 /kg, and over €2.69 /kg.  
 In addition to the actual willingness to pay question, Arrow et al. (1993) 
recommended posing the question “Are you willing to pay anything at all?” 
to the respondents. The aim is to identify the respondents with zero or even 
negative willingness to pay, as well as the so-called protest responses. 
 In general, protest responses are linked with the rejection of the sce-
nario, especially if the scenario is not considered credible, or with the 
 44 
method of payment proposed in the willingness to pay question, such as 
price or tax increases. In actual terms, protest responses comprise motives 
that unambiguously reject the valuation scenario, either as unrealistic or 
poorly defined. Protest responses may also be related to the proposed 
method of payment, which in this case study was increased food prices. Fig-
ure 6 presents the valuation questions posed in this study. 
 Willingness to pay studies often assume that a good is useful to the 
consumers (as the very term ’good’ implies), whereby an increased supply of 
the good increases consumer welfare. Kriström (1997) maintains that it is 
also reasonable to assume that some consumers will receive no additional 
gain for an increased supply of a non-market good. For example, in this 
study, vegetarian respondents were not necessarily interested in increased 
beef product information. Such respondents manifest genuine unwillingness 
to pay for an increased supply of the good in question. 
 In addition to the willingness to pay questions, the survey set out to 
observe issues related to beef buying and consumption, opinions on food-
related risks, and personal background data. Views on the safety of beef 
were asked only after the actual willingness to pay question, to prevent the 
order of the questions from creating any unintended bias towards exceed-
ingly high willingness to pay by reminding the respondents of risks and haz-
ards. The complete survey form is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
 
4.3.2 The dichotomic question format 
 
In willingness to pay surveys, the dichotomic question format is the most 
prevalent, despite an ongoing debate on the selection and applicability of the 
various questioning techniques (e.g., Arrow et al. 1993, Bateman et al. 
2002). As an advantage, this technique provides ease of response by using 
questions simulating the consumer decision-making process at the moment 
of purchase, which makes this format applicable in survey-based studies. 
 As a disadvantage, this technique is considered to elicit only very lim-
ited information on the respondents’ willingness to pay, whereby certain dis-
tribution assumptions must be made for willingness to pay. Proposing vary-
ing bids to a given proportion of the respondents also calls for a large origi-
nal sample. 
 The single-bound dichotomic question format was first presented by 
Bishop and Heberlein in their study (1979). A single-bound dichotomic ques-
tion queries whether the respondents are willing to pay a given amount of 
money, eliciting either “yes” or “no” answers. Thus, the dependent variable 
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can receive only two values. Variables with two values are often analysed 
using so-called qualitative variable analysis methods. The statistical analysis 
methods for qualitative or categorical variables have particularly been devel-
oped in biosciences, in dose-response studies. These studies strive to deter-
mine, for instance, the correspondence between given toxin doses and pro-
portional numbers of deaths. The analogy to the CV method is as follows: 
the higher the “dose” or the proposed bid, the higher the number of 
“deaths”, or “no” responses in terms of willingness to pay (Hanemann and 
Kanninen 1996). 
 The dichotomic question format reached the peak of its popularity in the 
early 1990s, and subsequently experienced a downturn. The main reason for 
the declining popularity has been the debate on the best ways to ensure in-
centive compatibility, or framing questions so that the respondents answer 
the willingness to pay questions as truthfully as possible, according to their 
preferences (Bateman et al. 2002). In the practical survey situation, it 
means that it is the respondent’s strategic goal to accept the proposed bid, if 
willingness to pay is greater than or equal to the bid, or to reject the bid in 
the opposite case. 
 It is also considered a weakness of this questioning technique that the 
respondents may very easily respond “yes” (‘yea-saying’). Though this phe-
nomenon might occur to some degree, Bateman et al. (2002) consider so-
called ‘nay-saying’ a graver problem. Diametrically opposed to the previous 
phenomenon, here the respondents either protest to certain characteristics 
in the scenario, or lack confidence in, for instance, the ability of the public 
authorities to produce the good at issue. 
 
 
4.3.3 Interval questions 
 
Although respondents regard the above-described dichotomic question set-
ting as an easy format with questions that are simple to answer, Hanley and 
Kriström (2002) showed in their study that instead of specific bid sums, the 
respondents preferred expressing their willingness to pay as intervals. Be-
cause a dichotomic question may easily elicit “yes” responses, the reliability 
of this study was improved by also exploring the consumer willingness to 
pay by means of willingness to pay intervals. In the actual survey, the inter-
val-based willingness to pay question was implemented as a simplified ver-
sion of the payment card question, with all intervals available for review to 
the survey-takers. A total of six intervals were presented to the respondents 
for consideration. 
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 One of the advantages of the payment card question is that the ability 
to see several willingness to pay bids makes responding and thus defining a 
price for willingness to pay easier. At the same time, the so-called anchoring 
effect is avoided, i.e., responses do not become fixed to any single proposed 
bid, although the selection of the ending points of the intervals does also 
influence this questioning format. Another advantage of this questioning 
technique is that it elicits more information on the distribution than simple 
Yes/No questions. According to Haab and McConnell (2002), an interval 
question can be modelled in a similar way to a dichotomic question. An in-
terval question may also be modelled parametrically (Huhtala 2004, Cam-
eron and Hubbert 1989). In this study, the interval question was not mod-
elled. 
 
 
4.4 Validity and reliability of the chosen method 
 
4.4.1 Validity 
 
Validity can be examined from various perspectives, the most important of 
which in willingness to pay studies are content and construct validity 
(Mitchell and Carson 1989). In the context of a willingness to pay study, the 
theoretical construct to be obtained is the maximal consumer willingness to 
pay, or the maximum amount of money the consumer would actually pay for 
the existence of the good to be valuated on the markets (Mitchell and Carson 
1989). 
 Content validity consists of measuring conceptually relevant issues. In 
willingness to pay studies, particular emphasis falls on the careful construc-
tion of the survey form, especially its actual hypothetical scenario and will-
ingness to pay question. 
 The validity of CV studies has often been challenged, because the differ-
ent willingness to pay questions (open question versus dichotomic, dichoto-
mic question versus payment card) have elicited varying willingness to pay 
estimates, although in theory they should all describe the same theoretical 
construct: Hicksian consumer surplus. All question formats have their weak-
nesses and strengths, of which the most studied are the effect of the selec-
tion of the bids or end points, the so-called anchoring effect, incentive com-
patibility, and the restrictions imposed by the statistical characteristics of 
each question format. 
 Construct validity means the ability of a given measure to generate the 
results expected from the study, in which case the measure as a whole 
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works as it is supposed to. In willingness to pay studies, construct validity 
can be estimated where parallel markets exist, or for example where ex-
perimental markets can be created for the goods (Mitchell and Carson 1989). 
Hanemann (1994) outlines three ways to improve the validity of a study: to 
repeat the study, to compare the results of the study with other results, and 
to compare the results of the study to real behaviour whenever possible. 
To improve the validity of this study, researchers and experts representing 
various disciplines and research institutes were asked to review the survey 
form and provide comments and feedback. The survey form was also pre-
tested prior to the actual survey. 
 
 
4.4.2 Reliability 
 
In a CV study, the attributes of the good to be valuated are described to the 
respondents using a scenario defined to the highest possible degree of clarity 
and concreteness, and a sufficient level of credibility. By creating the attrib-
utes and credible markets for the good, a situation is constructed where will-
ingness to pay depends on or is, in other words, contingent on the scenario. 
This is also how the name for the method was derived. 
 Hanemann (1994) states that reliability can be affected in the following 
stages: during the formation of the sample and formulation of the survey, in 
the valuation scenario, the questioning structure, and during the analysis of 
the research data. The most crucial element in a CV study and its reliability 
is the formulation of the valuation question. To improve reliability, the valua-
tion scenario must be as realistic and concrete as possible. In this study, the 
hypothetical bias cannot be considered a major problem, because the good 
to be valuated (increased quality information) becomes concrete in the con-
text of buying beef, which is a familiar decision-making situation for most 
respondents. 
 The actual willingness to pay question should be formulated so that it 
restricts valuations to a situation that behaviourally resembles voting, where 
the responses are of the Yes/No type, or so-called closed questions (Arrow et 
al. 1993, Hanemann 1994). The dichotomic questioning format was chosen 
because it can be implemented as a computer-aided survey. For example, 
the NOOA Panel (Arrow et al. 1993) specifically recommended the dichoto-
mic questioning format. 
 The willingness to pay question is constructed around a specific good, to 
ensure its maximal relevance and credibility to the respondents. The actual 
scenario should seem as credible as possible, to encourage the respondents 
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to express their willingness to pay, even in the absence of actual transac-
tions. The method of payment, e.g., taxes or price increases, must have a 
credible linkage to the supply of the good in question. 
 Since the mid-1980s, the most prevalent question format has been the 
closed question. The deciding argument has been the fact that the closed 
question format is easier and more familiar to the respondents. In the course 
of normal commerce, we have to think whether we are willing to buy a given 
product at a given price. According to Hanemann (1994), people are more 
willing to tell what a given good costs than what it would be worth to them. 
The respondents have strategic reasons for quoting prices lower than the full 
value of the good. The closed question format does not offer strategic rea-
sons for lower price quotes. 
 CV studies have been criticised for the so-called hypothetical bias, or 
the fact that in reality the respondents will not pay the quoted prices. The 
hypothetical bias can be reduced by making the scenario as realistic as pos-
sible. In this study, willingness to pay is linked to the buying of a private 
good, whereby the situation is familiar to the respondents from previous ex-
perience. 
 In this study, the construction of the scenario presented problems with 
the issue of scope, or changes in the amount of the good to be valuated. In 
the scenario, the changes could not be explicitly defined, because detailed 
description and cataloguing of all available quality information would have 
complicated the actual willingness to pay scenario. Thus, the willingness to 
pay scenario of this study pointed out to the respondents that it is in fact 
possible for consumers to receive highly detailed quality information. 
 In terms of critiquing the questions framed in this study, one might 
speculate whether the outcome would have been different if the respondents 
were queried about each quality-related piece of information separately. It 
was the purpose of this study to determine, through focused questions, what 
specific quality information the respondents consider relevant to produce, 
but the willingness to pay for each information requirement was not 
surveyed. Detailed findings on the requirements for new information in 
addition to the current package labelling are presented in Chapter 5.6.  
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5 PRESENTATION AND REVIEW OF RESEARCH 
DATA 
 
 
5.1 Research data 
 
The survey form was pre-tested at the S-Market store in Vuosaari, Helsinki, 
in January 2000. In addition, experts in other research institutes were con-
sulted for improvement suggestions. Based on the responses received during 
pilot-testing, a bid vector was incorporated into the final form, and the ques-
tions exploring consumer willingness to pay were made more specific. 
 The actual survey was conducted in March 2000, using the Gallup-
Kanava (GallupChannel) of Food and Farm Facts Ltd. The GallupKanava is a 
system created for the collection of data for various surveys and Gallup polls 
from a permanent group of respondents on a weekly basis. Food and Farm 
Facts Ltd has furnished 1,300 households with personal computers and 
Internet access. The respondents had a six-day window for taking the sur-
vey, from Thursday to Tuesday, 2-7 March 2000. 
 The survey population, or the participating households are selected by 
applying multi-phased stratified sampling. The strata were defined based on 
the official income distribution statistics for the year 1998, compiled by Sta-
tistics Finland. Selection criteria for the sample are household size, as well as 
the socio-economic status and age of the reference persons. One third of the 
sample is changed annually. 
 A comparison of the structure of the sample and the general population 
data is presented in Table 3. In terms of gender distribution, the structure of 
the sample corresponds well with that of the general population. In terms of 
age distribution, the age groups 25-34 years and 35-44 years are propor-
tionally over-represented in the sample, while older age groups are propor-
tionally under-represented. Under 15-year-olds were excluded from this 
study. In regional terms, Southern Finland has a proportionally higher repre-
sentation in the sample of the study than in the general population. 
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Table 3.  Structure of the sample; distribution by sex, age and 
geographical region  
 General 
population1) 
Sample of the study 
Number 5,171,302 1,640 
 % % 
Sex, women 51.2 50.4 
   
Age % % 
Under 15 yrs 18.2 0.0 
15-24 yrs 12.8 13.5 
25-34 yrs 12.8 23.2 
35-44 yrs 14.8 24.8 
45-54 yrs 16.0 19.7 
Over 55 yrs 25.3 18.8 
   
Geographical region2) % % 
Uusimaa 26.7 29.1 
Southern Finland 35.2 42.0 
Eastern Finland 13.3 13.7 
Central Finland 13.6 13.2 
Northern Finland 10.8 2.1 
Åland Islands 0.5 0.0 
1) Based on the population statistics at the end of 1999 (Statistics Finland 2000) 
2) Based on NUTS2 (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques), the 
classification of territorial units defined by Eurostat (The Association of Finnish Local 
and Regional 
 
 
5.2 Zero bids and protest responses 
 
In this survey, 8% of the respondents were vegetarian (n = 130) and could 
therefore be assumed to protest meat-eating in general and the promotion 
of meat-eating in particular, for ethical reasons. The sample also included 
respondents who considered building a comprehensive quality information 
system a worthwhile idea and might even pay more for quality information, 
but who did not believe that the authorities have the capability to create a 
sufficiently reliable system. Another factor increasing the respondents’ un-
certainty is that the various food safety attributes do not necessarily remain 
unchanged throughout the food chain, as discussed in Chapter 3.1.2 con-
cerning microbiological risks. 
 The first question on consumer willingness to pay divided the respon-
dents into those willing to pay and those unwilling to pay, thus allowing the 
respondents willing to pay to be distinctly identified from the others. Based 
on this first dichotomic question, it was possible to conclude that a relatively 
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high proportion of the respondents, 42% (n = 696), was not willing to pay 
for quality information. 
 Motives underlying this unwillingness to pay were queried in order to 
make it possible to identify in the sample those respondents who protested 
the actual valuation question or the scenario. For example, they might pro-
test the payment mechanism or the implementation of change in general. 
Ethical reasons might also act as motivation for protest responses (Bateman 
et al. 2002). Table 4 below presents the motives proposed in the survey for 
unwillingness to pay. The respondents were allowed to select several mo-
tives. 
 The first three motives for unwillingness to pay represent so-called le-
gitimate zero bids, i.e. respondents with no willingness to pay for increased 
information on food quality and safety. The majority considered that the cur-
rent labelling system guarantees sufficient food safety and quality. The mo-
tive with the second highest response rate was inability to afford more ex-
pensive beef. The third most popular reason was lack of trust in package 
labelling, or that increased package labelling could ensure better quality.  
 In the survey form, those who selected “another reason” (n = 127) 
were asked to explain in writing why they were not willing to pay for in-
creased information. Most of the responses to this open question could be 
interpreted as distinct protest responses. In this study, the respondents who 
gave even a single protest response (motives 4-6) were excluded from the 
statistical analysis (Table 4). In consequence, the number of non-
respondents decreased to 347, and that of the entire sample to 1,290 re-
spondents. The proportion of those with genuine unwillingness to pay is 
about 27%. 
 
Table 4.  Motives for unwillingness to pay, and number of protest 
responses (with respondents allowed to select several motives). 
 Legitimate zero 
bid (L) or protest 
response (P) 
Number of 
responses 
Proportion of 
all responses 
1. Current labelling provides 
enough information L 305 35 
2. I cannot afford to buy more 
expensive food L 197 22 
3. Origin and quality of food 
are not important to me L 25 3 
4. Food products are always 
risky, regardless of where they 
were produced and labelled 
P 120 14 
5. I do not know exactly what 
information is available P 110 12 
6. Other reason P 127 14 
Total responses  884 100 
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5.3 Consumption of beef and buying behaviour 
 
In terms of the consumption of beef, 95% of the respondents stated that 
they eat food made from beef. About one third of them have a beef-
containing meal about once a week (Table 5). A comparison with the study8 
conducted by Henson and Northern (2000) shows that in many European 
countries (Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom), the 
majority of consumers eat beef once a week. Differences can be seen at the 
extreme ends of the consumption scale. In Ireland, Spain and Italy, the pro-
portion of those who consume beef several times a week is notably higher 
than in Finland. 
 In Finland, 5% of the respondents never eat beef-containing meals. No 
major shifts towards vegetarianism occurred between 1999 and 2000, as a 
similar percentage was found in a study conducted about a year earlier using 
the GallupKanava (Pohjalainen 1999). Henson and Northern (2000) found 
that the percentage of non-beef-eaters varies considerably between Euro-
pean countries. For example, in Germany and the United Kingdom the pro-
portion exceeds 25%, and also in Ireland and Spain nearly one fifth of the 
consumers never eat beef. Only in Sweden and Italy does the proportion of 
non-beef-eaters remain below 10%. 
 
Table 5.     Consumption of beef; by number of respondents and percentage 
 
 Number of 
respondents 
% 
Daily 23 1 
Several times a week 427 26 
About once a week 528 32 
Twice or three times a month 298 18 
About once a month 115 7 
Rarely 170 10 
Never 79 5 
Total 1,640 100 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 A survey conducted in six European countries (Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom) in March 1997. Some 400 consumers were interviewed 
in each country. 
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The respondents were also queried about home-made beef-containing 
meals. Over 30% of the respondents use ground beef 1-2 times a week. In 
households, the majority of beef-containing meals are made from ground 
beef. Marinated beef, or beef strips or cubes are used less frequently than 
other types of beef. 
 Of the entire sample (n = 1,640), 1,345 respondents buy beef. They 
were asked where they most often buy their beef, and in what type of pack-
aging. The responses showed that the majority of beef is bought store-
packaged. Store-packaged beef is bought more frequently than industrially 
packaged. In the second place, beef is selected nearly as often industrially 
packaged as directly from a meat clerk at a meat counter. 
 According to Järvelä (1998), some consumers were suspicious of both 
packaged and marinated beef. In this study such suspicion was also evident 
in the buying behaviour of beef consumers, and 11% of the respondents had 
occasionally bought beef directly from producers. Consumers often buy beef 
directly from producers in order to ensure its origin, and there was also dis-
satisfaction towards the quality and variety of beef sold at stores. 
 
 
5.4 Consumer opinions of food safety and quality 
 
One of the objectives of this study was to determine which food-related risk 
factors worry consumers most. The consumers stated that the most harmful 
food-related risks are food-transmitted zoonotic diseases such as those 
caused by Salmonella, EHEC and campylobacteria. The second most harmful 
category according to the consumer ratings was environmental pollutants 
(lead, cadmium), and in third place, drug residues (hormones and antibiot-
ics). Only after these two did the consumers rate pesticide and herbicide 
residues and genetically modified organisms (Figure 7). 
 Nutritional aspects such as excessive fat, salt and sugar were not con-
sidered overly harmful. In the consumers’ perceptions of risks, the ability to 
affect the degree of risk is a major factor. In general, risks that one can im-
pact to a considerable degree are perceived as inferior to those one cannot 
impact in any way. In the case of nutritional risk factors, current package 
labelling provides relevant information on the nutritional contents of food 
products, e.g., salt and fat contents. 
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0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 100 %
… diseases transmitted 
from animals to humans 
… environmental pollutants
… drug residues 
(hormones, antibiotics)
… pesticide and herbicide 
residues
… genetically modifed organisms (GMO) in animal 
feed,or genetic modification of animals
… excessive fat
… excessive salt
… additives and preservatives
… excessive sugar
Very harmful Fairly harmful Somewhat harmful Not harmful at all Cannot say
 
 
Figure 7.  Consumer perceptions of the harmfulness of food products. 
 
 
5.5 Usage of current beef package labelling 
 
One of the objectives of the survey was to determine how often beef-buying 
consumers take into consideration observable quality attributes and package 
labelling. One question set out to determine how often consumers use cur-
rent package labelling as a decision-making aid. Most often, consumers will 
check the “use by” date: 73% of the respondents stated that they check the 
“use by” date every time they buy beef. The second most important piece of 
information is the production or packaging date. After these aspects, con-
sumers consider the colour of the beef, and the Finnish food label. The price 
of the beef ranks fifth (Figure 8). 
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"Use by" date
Production date or packaging date
Finnish beef -marking
Colour of the beef
Price
Finnish food label
Producer's quality label
Fat content
Producer's quality label
Organic food label
every time almost every time about every second time occasionally never
 
 
Figure 8.  Usage of current beef package labelling. 
 
 
The quality labels of private food businesses were not considered very im-
portant as selection criteria. In this context, it must be noted that the avail-
ability and informational contents of private-enterprise quality labels are still 
under development. This applies especially well to the organic food label: 
currently, the availability of organic beef is limited; thus, the question may 
have made the respondents refer to organic food products in general. 
 
 
5.6 Requirements for new information 
 
In addition to the willingness to pay, consumers’ informational requirements 
were explored in detail. The responses show that in the first place, consum-
ers would like to receive information on the control of zoonotic diseases that 
are contagious to humans. This is consistent with the fact that consumers 
considered food-transmitted zoonotic diseases as the highest risk factor in 
food. Similarly, other process control related information (e.g., information 
on the use of drugs and on the monitoring of heavy metals and slaughter-
houses) ranked high among the top responses. Information on any potential 
genetic modification (modification of animal genes, and use of genetically 
modified animal feed) was also considered important, even though genetic 
modification was not regarded as a high risk factor (Figure 7, Chapter 5.4.). 
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Based on the responses, it can be concluded that safety-related quality cues 
are important to consumers. 
 The second most important aspect to the respondents was traceability. 
Of all information on the origin of food, the respondents gave the highest 
priority to the country of origin, while region, farm or animal-specific infor-
mation was not considered very important at all. In terms of informational 
requirements concerning production processes, aspects related to animal 
welfare, the use of pesticides and herbicides, and the safety of feed gained 
the most prominence. Table 6 lists the surveyed details according to the av-
erages calculated from the responses. The table also specifies whether the 
attribute in question is related to safety (S), origin (O), or the production 
process (P). Based on the responses, attributes related to safety and origin 
are the most important sources of informational requirements. 
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Table 6.  Consumer requirements for additional information, by response 
average. 
Average: 1 = not important at all, and 5 = very 
                    important 
Attribute: S = Safety, O = Origin, P = Production  
                     process 
Average Attribute 
1. Control at farms of diseases transmitted from 
animals to humans 
4.4 S 
2. Has the production animal been subject to genetic 
modification 
4.3 S 
3. Country of origin 4.3 O 
4. Has the production animal been given any 
hormones 
4.3 S 
5. How often beef is inspected for EHEC and 
Salmonella bacteria 
4.3 S 
6. How is the use of antibiotics and other veterinary 
drugs controlled 
4.2 S 
7. Have animal feeds been subject to genetic 
modification 
4.1 S 
8. Inspections of slaughterhouses and their results 4.0 S 
9. How often beef is inspected for heavy metals and 
pesticide and herbicide residues 
4.0 S 
10. Control of animal welfare and conditions 3.9 P 
11. When was the production animal slaughtered 
and how long did it take for the beef to reach the 
consumers 
3.8 S 
12. Medication given to the production animal 3.8 S 
13. Is attention paid to the reduced use of pesticides 
and herbicides 
3.8 P 
14. Feeds used on farms 3.8 P 
15. Do animals have free-range, outdoor access 3.7 P 
16. Duration of animal transportation 3.6 P 
17. Is nutrient washout taken into consideration in 
beef production 
3.3 P 
18. Production animal from which beef comes 2.9 O 
19. Price paid to producer 2.9 P 
20. Prices paid to other stakeholders in the food 
chain (food industry, retail sector) 
2.8 P 
21. Does the production farm have an agricultural 
quality control system 
2.8 P 
22. Age of production animal 2.7 O 
23. Region of origin 2.6 O 
24. Breed of production animal 2.2 O 
25. Production farm 2.2 O 
26. Sex of production animal 2.1 O 
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In addition to these responses, the respondents could answer an open ques-
tion in case they had requirements for information which the survey form 
failed to specify. The open questions elicited some comments on organic 
food and animal welfare (n = 18). The survey form contained two questions 
that referred to animal welfare, but the subject was not directly linked to the 
concept of organic food. 
 Some responses contained comments on the excessive supply of infor-
mation, or on reliability of information. This question elicited 13 distinct pro-
test responses, most of them associated with the comments given by vege-
tarians. In addition to the details listed in Table 6, the respondents did not 
express any specific further informational requirements. 
 
 
5.7 Trust in providers of information 
 
According to Mitchell and Carson (1995), it is important for a valuation sce-
nario to specify the producer of a non-market good. In the survey, the pro-
vider of information was specified as “the whole food chain together”. Con-
sumer trust in these sources of information was explored with three-
dimensional questions: who is the fastest producer of information, who pro-
duces the most reliable information, and who produces the largest amount of 
information? 
 When queried about the most reliable producer of information on the 
safety and quality of food, the respondents were divided into two categories 
of near-equal size. Altogether, 40% of the respondents stated that the most 
reliable source of information would be the Finnish authorities responsible for 
food safety control. Food safety information generated by the entire food 
chain together (producers, the food industry, the retail sector, consumers, 
agricultural expert organisations, research organisations and public authori-
ties) was regarded as almost equally reliable (38% of the respondents). 
 Private research laboratories, the food industry and European Union 
food safety authorities were considered as less reliable sources of informa-
tion. Based on the responses, it can be concluded that the majority of the 
respondents (78%) trust in the Finnish food safety authorities, as well as the 
co-operation of all stakeholders in the food chain. 
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6 WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 
 
6.1 Modelling willingness to pay 
 
Willingness to pay can be analysed in several ways. Chapter 6.1.1 explores 
the motives for willingness to pay using a binary logistic model. Parametric 
modelling of willingness to pay is discussed in Chapter 6.1.2, based on ran-
dom utility and random willingness to pay models. Chapters 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 
study willingness to pay through non-parametric modelling. 
 
 
6.1.1 Binary logistic model 
 
The factors affecting consumer willingness to pay were examined using a 
binary logistic model. The dependent variable of the model divided the re-
spondents into two categories: those willing to pay and those unwilling to 
pay. The purpose of the model was to identify the most important explana-
tory factors for willingness to pay. In the analysis, willingness to pay acted 
as a dichotomic dependent variable that received the value 1 for respon-
dents indicating willingness to pay > 0, and, respectively, the value 0 for 
respondents indicating no willingness to pay. 
 The method calculates the probability (y = 1) of an outcome, as derived 
from the following formula: 
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where z is a linear function of the explanatory parameters. 
 The purpose of a logit analysis is to explain willingness to pay on the 
basis of a theoretical framework. Motives explaining willingness to pay can 
be defined as follows, on the basis of the theoretical framework underlying 
this and earlier studies: 
– awareness of risks (Latouche et al. 1998); 
– personal negative experience of illness caused by inferior food 
(Bettman 1979, Järvelä 1998); 
– other people’s negative experiences of illness caused by inferior 
food (Bettman 1979, Järvelä 1998); 
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– food-related risk factors and their harmfulness (risks specific to 
given product categories; Dowling and Staelin 1994); 
– knowledge of the product (McCarthy and Henson 2005); 
– trust in the providers of information (McCarthy and Henson 2005, 
Piironen et al. 2004) 
– trust in storekeepers (McCarthy and Henson 2005, Piiroinen 2004); 
– sociodemographic characteristics (sex, age, gross and net income 
of the household, region of residence, political party, number of 
children, special diet, vocational training, basic education, type of 
residential area); 
– usage of current package labelling (only beef-buying respondents 
queried, n = 1036); 
– knowledge of primary production in general. 
 Appendix 1 contains a detailed list of the classification and coding of the 
explanatory variables. 
 
 
6.1.2 Random utility and random willingness to pay models 
 
For the econometric modelling of a dichotomic willingness to pay question, 
there are two approaches: estimating willingness to pay on the basis of util-
ity theory or, directly, using the distribution of willingness to pay (Bateman 
et al. 2002, Haab and McConnell 2002, Hanemann and Kanninen 1996). 
Bishop and Heberlein (1979) were the first to employ the dichotomic willing-
ness to pay question, from which Hanemann (1984) later formed the first 
statistical model based on the utility theory. Hanemann’s (1984) willingness 
to pay model was founded on McFadden’s (1974) concept of random utility. 
Hanemann’s (1984) random utility model (RUM) allows the essential pa-
rameters used in willingness to pay studies to be estimated and interpreted 
according to economic theory (Haab and McConnell 2002). 
 The model assumes that in terms of willingness to pay, the respondent 
is comparing the respective utility arising from two different situations: 
 
(6.2)  ),,( ijjjiij zyuu   
 
where i = 1 describes the situation after the occurrence of the scenario and i 
= 0 describes the current situation.  
 In the formula, the variables explaining the utility are yj, or the discre-
tionary income of the respondent j; and zj, describing household characteris-
tics and attributes explaining selection, as well as an error term, εij. While 
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factors contributing to individual decision-making are partly unknown to the 
researcher, a random error term, ε (McFadden 1974) is incorporated into the 
model. Factors unknown to the researcher may be associated either with 
personal characteristics, or the characteristics of the good to be valuated; 
they may arise from differences between individual preferences, as well as 
measurement error (Hanemann 1984, Hanemann and Kanninen 1996). 
 The model assumes that the respondent compares the original situation 
q0 to the change q1 presented in the scenario. Thus, in this study, it is as-
sumed that the respondents compared the improved availability of quality 
information to the situation prevalent at the time of the survey. In the origi-
nal context, utility is thus described as follows: 
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and, respectively, after the change: 
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A dichotomic question assumes that the respondent j responds “yes” to the 
proposed sum tj, if the utility from the policy change is greater in the new 
situation and there is willingness to pay the proposed sum. 
 Because some of the respondents’ preferences were unknown, “yes” 
and “no” responses could be determined using probabilities, and the error 
term εij, was incorporated into the model. The probability of the respondent’s 
“yes” response to the policy change q0  q1 is described with the following 
formula: 
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The parametric estimation requires two decisions related to the modelling. 
The first decision concerns the functional form of the utility function u(yj,, zj, 
εij ), and the second, the distribution of the error term εij (Haab and McCon-
nell 2002). The utility function is divided into deterministic and stochastic 
preferences by using the indirect utility function vi (yj,, zj) and error term εij, 
as follows: 
 
(6.6)  ijjjiijjji zyvzyu   ),(),,(  
Thus, the probability of the “yes” response of the respondent j is as follows: 
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The indirect utility function can be determined by using several different dis-
tributions, and economic theory does not point to any specific distribution 
(Hanemann and Kanninen 1996). Usually, the dichotomic question format 
presumes positive willingness to pay from all respondents. Common distribu-
tion assumptions for the utility function are the log-logistic distribution, log-
normal distribution, or Weinbull distribution. Other frequently used distribu-
tions include the Box-Cox utility function, with its logit and probit versions 
(Hanemann and Kanninen 1996). 
 For the indirect utility function based estimation approach described 
above, there is an alternative estimation method, based on the bid function 
approach, also known as the random willingness to pay model (random 
WTP). Because willingness to pay is regarded as a sufficiently determined 
concept in itself, it can be used without explicitly determining the format of 
the underlying utility function (Cameron 1988). Cameron’s (1988) model 
directly specifies a given cumulative frequency function (cdf) GC(·) for indi-
vidual willingness to pay, C(q0, q1, y, p, s, ). The error term  continues to 
describe the variation that the researcher cannot observe. Thus: 
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If cdf is assumed to follow a normal distribution G(x) = Φ(x), a probit model 
is obtained. 
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Respectively, if cdf is assumed to follow a logistic distribution G(x) = (1+e-x)-
1, a logit model is obtained. 
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Several other alternatives exist, such as the Box-Cox transformation used by 
Cameron and James (1987). According to Bateman et al. (2002), the litera-
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ture on willingness to pay does not present a clear consensus on which ap-
proach, RUM or random WTP, is the more appropriate. If one wishes to re-
main loyal to the fundamental concepts of the Neoclassical economic theory, 
one chooses RUM. Bateman et al. (2002) stated that RUM determines the 
impact of income on the utility. The random WTP model determines the im-
pact of income on willingness to pay. 
 
 
6.1.3 The Turnbull estimator 
 
In willingness to pay studies, the respondents’ willingness to pay can also be 
estimated non-parametrically, without assuming a utility function or distribu-
tion of an error term. In such cases, willingness to pay is estimated by using 
bid vectors, and point estimations of the willingness to pay probabilities. Ac-
cording to economic theory, as the bid sum increases, the locations of these 
points render the willingness to pay function genuinely monotonic at each 
point. However, in reality this fails to occur, for reasons such as random-
ness, and thus it is possible to set a strict monotonicity restriction for the 
estimation (Turnbull 1976, Ayer et al. 1955). In willingness to pay studies, 
the Turnbull estimator has been employed, for example, by Hanemann et al. 
(1994) and Haab and McConnell (1997).  
 In the non-parametric estimation of a dichotomic willingness to pay 
question, the relative proportions of “no” responses are calculated for each 
bid, a point estimation for the willingness to pay function is made for each 
bid ti, and the relative proportion of “no” responses Fj is calculated as fol-
lows: 
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where Nj is the proportion of “no” responses of the combined total Tj of all 
“yes” and “no” responses. 
 Although, when calculated using relative proportions, the original func-
tion Fj is not monotonic at every point, the proportions enable the calculation 
of new point estimations by means of the Turnbull distribution-free estimator 
(Turnbull 1976, Haab and McConnell 2002). A monotonicity restriction of Fj ≤ 
Fj+1 is set for the function, with all values of j (Haab and McConnell 2002). 
 If the consecutive relative proportions Fj+1 > Fj  are pooled, Fj+1 and Fj  
and a new probability value (Nj + Nj+1)/( Fj + Fj+1) are calculated. These 
substitutions are made until the function becomes monotonic. 
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 Willingness to pay is calculated from a monotonic willingness to pay 
curve by dividing willingness to pay into subranges {0-t1, t1-t2, …, tM*-U} 
(Turnbull 1976, Haab and McConnell 2002). To calculate the lower bound 
(LB) of willingness to pay, WTPLB  (where LB indicates that the accumulation 
of the probability mass is calculated only at the lower end bound of the 
subrange), F(0) = 0 and the upper bound Fw(U) for willingness to pay must 
also be determined. By using these subranges, willingness to pay can be cal-
culated with the following formula: 
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The variance for the willingness to pay estimation is obtained as follows: 
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The model described above can be applied to the modelling of a dichotomic 
willingness to pay question. The next chapter explores other alternatives for 
the non-parametric modelling of a dichotomic question. 
 
 
6.1.4 The Kriström distribution-free willingness to pay estimation 
 
In his article, Kriström (1990) utilised the Ayer et al. (1955) estimator in a 
nearly identical fashion. In Kriström’s (1990) model, willingness to pay is 
calculated geometrically from an area bounded by a survivor function and 
the x and y axes, by calculating the so-called survivor function *1 jF  be-
tween observed bid estimates. Between the point estimations, Kriström 
(1990) uses linear interpolation, whereby the survivor function is bounded 
by the x axis. 
 The area formed by two contiguous bids jt  and 1jt   is calculated as 
follows (Haab and McConnell 2002): 
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In the model, willingness to pay is obtained as follows: 
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To calculate the willingness to pay, 0ot  and the upper limit of willingness 
to pay 1Mt  must be determined. 
 In this study, the research data only included the respondents who ex-
hibited positive willingness to pay, whereby the survivor function *1 jF   
receives the value one with the bid zero. On the other hand, 1Mt  must be 
determined through linear interpolation. 
 
 
6.2 Results of the willingness to pay models 
 
This study employed contingent valuation to estimate consumer willingness 
to pay for an increased amount of information on the safety and quality of 
beef. Logit analysis was used to identify the factors influencing the ex-
pressed willingness to pay, including sociodemographic factors, personal ex-
periences of beef, perceived food risks and trust in the providers of informa-
tion. In this chapter, willingness to pay is calculated using parametric and 
non-parametric methods. 
 
 
6.2.1 Binomial logit model and factors explaining willingness to 
pay 
 
The factors affecting consumer willingness to pay were examined using a 
binomial logit model. The dependent variable of the model divided the re-
spondents into two categories: those willing to pay and those unwilling to 
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pay. In the survey, a total of 1,290 respondents (protest answers excluded) 
answered the first dichotomic willingness to pay question. Of this total, 944 
respondents (73%) indicated willingness to pay, while 346 (nearly 27% of all 
respondents) gave a negative response.  
 The purpose of the model was to identify factors distinguishing the two 
categories of consumers. In the analysis, willingness to pay acted as a di-
chotomic dependent variable that received a value 1 for respondents indicat-
ing willingness to pay > 0, and, respectively, a value of 0 for respondents 
indicating no willingness to pay. Appendix 1 presents a detailed classification 
of the explanatory variables. 
 The goodness of fit of the model to the research data was evaluated 
using the –2 Log Likelihood (1,327.671) and its explanatory power using the 
Cox-Snell R-square (0.126) and the Nagelkerke R-square (0.183). However, 
the interpretation of the Cox-Snell R-square value is not the same as in an 
ordinary linear regression analysis, because it cannot receive the value 1. 
However, the latter or Nagelkerke R-square value can be interpreted simi-
larly to that of linear regression analysis. In this case, the variables of the 
model only explained some 18.3% of the variance of the dependent variable. 
 Although the model did not appear particularly well-fitting when evalu-
ated using the –2LL and R-square values, it nevertheless succeeded in pre-
dicting nearly 80% of the observations into the correct category (Table 7). 
At the estimation stage, the model performed quite robustly, i.e. during the 
statistical analysis of the explanatory variables, the removal or insertion of 
variables kept the R-square values, preceding signs and mean errors of the 
model quite stable. 
 
 
Table 7.  Observed and predicted values produced by the binomial logit 
model. 
 
Observed values Predicted values 
 No willingness 
to pay 
Positive 
willingness to 
pay 
Correctly 
predicted 
(%) 
No willingness to pay 83 263 24.1 
Positive willingness to pay 42 902 95.5 
Total percentage   76.4 
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Only the statistically most significant coefficients were selected for inclusion 
in the model, as presented in Table 8 below. The results of the model 
showed that the factors with a positive effect on willingness to pay included 
several trust-related variables: for example, consumer trust in a particular 
provider of information increased positive willingness to pay. Factors de-
creasing willingness to pay, or coefficients with negative preceding signs, 
were observed in the cases where the respondents rarely ate beef. 
 Based on the theoretical framework of this study, one might have as-
sumed that negative personal experiences would emerge as a significant ex-
planatory factor for willingness to pay, but in the research data this was not 
the case. Instead, it was the variable representing other people’s negative 
experiences of food that was found significant in the model.  This is a rather  
 
Table 8.    Binomial logit model (n = 1,290). 
 
Variable β S.E Sig. Odds 
ratio 
Buys beef (β1) 0.533 0.184 0.004 1.704 
Knows or has heard of people who have 
fallen sick from inferior food (β2) 
0.317 0.139 0.022 1.373 
Considers genetic modification of food 
harmful (β3) 
0.520 0.143 0.000 1.682 
Rarely eats beef (β4) -0.490 0.171 0,004 0.613 
Has trust in storekeepers (β5) 0.303 0.139 0.029 1.354 
Has trust in the information provided by 
the Finnish authorities (β6) 
1.643 0.261 0.000 5.171 
Has trust in the information provided by 
the whole food chain together (β7) 
1.554 0.236 0.000 4.728 
Has trust in the information provided by 
private research laboratories (β8) 
1.635 0.381 0.000 5.131 
Has trust in the information provided by 
consumer organisations (β9) 
0.895 0.333 0.007 2.447 
Has trust in the information provided by 
the food industry (β10) 
1.451 0.645 0.025 4.266 
Has trust in the information provided by 
the European Union authorities (β11) 
1.283 0.415 0.002 3.609 
Has responsibility for grocery shopping, 
alone or together with someone else 
(β12) 
0.485 0.161 0.003 1.624 
Considers foodborne zoonotic diseases 
harmful (β13) 
0.383 0.183 0.036 1.467 
Constant (α) -1.912 0.317 0.000 0.148 
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interesting result, because some 17% of the respondents reported personal 
experience of illness caused by inferior food, while 50% knew or had heard 
of other people with similar negative experiences. 
 Of the variables describing the categorical risks of food, two were se-
lected for inclusion in the model: genetic modification of food and foodborne 
zoonotic diseases, where they were considered as harmful risks. Quite dis-
tinctly, the most significant variables affecting consumer willingness to pay 
were trust in the providers of information, as well as trust in the capability of 
storekeepers to ensure that the beef sold in stores is safe. Trust in the op-
erators of the food chain was also significant for willingness to pay. 
 Of the factors describing consumer buying behaviour, two were selected 
for inclusion in the model: the respondents who do buy beef in the first 
place, and the respondents with grocery shopping responsibility in the fam-
ily. 
 Numerous other variables were also tested for inclusion in the model, 
but they did not prove significant (Appendix 1). For example, several typical 
sociodemographic factors describing the respondents, such as age, sex, oc-
cupation, gross income and net income, were not significant for willingness 
to pay in this model. This is a typical phenomenon in studies focused on con-
sumer choice (Enneking 2004). 
The predicted probability for willingness to pay can be calculated as 
follows: 
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where 
 
z = -1.912 + 0.533 * β1 + 0.317 * β2 + 0.520 * β3 – 0.490 * β4 + 0.303 * 
β5 + 1.643 * β6 + 1.554 * β7 + 1.635 * β8 + 0.895 * β9 + 1.451* β10 + 
1.283 * β11 + 0.485 * β12 + 0.383 * β13 
 
In Table 8 above, the odds ratio calculated for each variable describes the 
degree to which the variables affect the probability. Below, two sample re-
spondent profiles demonstrate the effect of the coefficients on the probability 
of the willingness to pay or unwillingness to pay. If the predicted probability 
receives a value < 0.5, the respondent is not willing to pay. If the probability 
value is greater than or equal to 0.5, the respondent belongs in the category 
of those willing to pay. 
 
Sample profile, Respondent 1: 
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 Respondent 1 does not buy beef ((β1 = 0, β12 = 0) and rarely eats 
beef (β4 = 1). In addition, Respondent 1 considers neither genetic 
modification of food nor foodborne zoonotic diseases as harmful 
food-related risks (β3 = 0 and β13 = 0), and all trust-related vari-
ables (β5 – β11) receive the value 0 (no trust in storekeepers or 
quality information from any source). This probability receives the 
value 0.083. A probability value of 0.083 indicates that the respon-
dent is not willing to pay for increased beef quality information. 
Sample profile, Respondent 2: 
 Respondent 2 buys beef (β1 = 1) and considers genetic modification 
of food and foodborne zoonotic diseases as harmful food-related 
risks (β3  and β13 = 1). Respondent 2 also trusts in the information 
provided by the Finnish authorities (β6 = 1). This probability re-
ceives the value 0.810. A probability value greater than or equal to 
0.5 indicates that the respondent is willing to pay for increased 
beef quality information. 
 
Limiting the model to beef-buyers and primary grocery shoppers 
 
The next step was to limit the model to apply only to the respondents with 
the primary responsibility for grocery shopping in the household, and to 
those who buy beef in the first place (n = 889). The purpose was to deter-
mine whether the explanatory variables occurring in this group were differ-
ent in comparison to the total sample. Usage of the current package labelling 
could also be studied in this group, because all respondents bought beef at 
least occasionally. 
 In this model, the –2 Log Likelihood received the value 876.831, and 
the explanatory power remained noticeably lower than in the previous 
model: the Cox-Snell R-square received the value 0.072 and Nagelkerke R-
Square 0.115. Despite the lower explanatory power, the model succeeded in 
predicting 80.5% of the observations into the correct category (Table 9). 
 The two trust-related variables, trust in the storekeepers and trust in 
the various providers of information (public authorities, the whole food chain 
together, private laboratories) were retained in the model. On the other 
hand, genetic modification of food was now excluded from the variables de-
scribing food-related harmful risks, and only a single variable remained to 
represent this category: foodborne zoonotic diseases. 
 Knowledge of other people’s negative experiences of food also remained 
a variable explaining willingness to pay in this group of respondents. Be-
cause every member of this group bought beef, the model was able to test 
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the usage of the current package labelling. Of the current markings, the re-
spondents check the “use by” date, the Finnish beef label, and the organic 
food label. 
 
Table 9.  Willingness to buy of the respondents with primary responsibility 
for grocery shopping 
Variable β S.E Sig. Odds 
Has trust in storekeepers (β1) 0.457 0.182 0.009 1.607 
Considers foodborne zoonotic diseases 
harmful (β2) 
0.491 0.241 0.042 1.634 
Knows or has heard of people who 
have fallen sick from inferior food (β3) 
0.357 0.183 0.051 1.428 
Has trust in the information provided 
by the Finnish authorities (β4) 
0.962 0.240 0.000 2.616 
Has trust in the information provided 
by the whole food chain (β5) 
0.935 0.242 0,000 2.546 
Has trust in the information provided 
by private research laboratories (β6) 
1.648 0.556 0.003 5.199 
Checks the “use by” date in the 
current package labelling (β6) 
0.551 0.274 0.044 1.734 
Checks the Finnish beef marking in the 
current package labelling (β6) 
0.610 0.234 0.009 1.840 
Checks the organic food label in the 
current package labelling (β6) 
0.663 0.238 0.005 1.940 
Constant (α) -1.391 0.404 0.000 0.249 
 
 
6.2.2 Parametric estimation of willingness to pay 
 
The respondents who gave a positive response to the first willingness to pay 
question were next posed a dichotomic willingness to pay question proposing 
a single bid sum. Protest responses were excluded from the statistical 
analysis. 
 In the model, the dependent variable still received the value 1 for will-
ingness to pay, and 0 for no willingness to pay. The explanatory variables 
were the proposed bid, as well as the respondents’ net income and sex (1 = 
female, 2 = male) (Table 10). 
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Table 10. Description of the variables and average values of the dichoto-
mic model. 
 
Variable Description Average 
(n = 813) 
Bid sum Price increase for beef, €/kg 1.43 
t109 Available income, € 2,048 
t1 Sex of the respondent (percentage of 
women) 
50 
 
Table 11 presents the parameter values obtained from the logit and probit 
estimations of the linear random utility function. 
 
Table 11.   Results of the dichotomic logit and probit models. 
 
Pr( < (o + 1 t1 + 2 t109-  bid)/)) 
  logistic 
Parameter value 
(mean distribution) 
 normal 
Parameter value 
(mean distribution) 
 
/  -0.192 *** 
(0.0232) 
-1.118 
(0.0137) 
 
o / 2.884 *** 
(0.389) 
1.752 
(0.227) 
 
1/ -0.427 ** 
(0.187) 
-0.255 
(0.112) 
 
2/ -0.000  
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
    
Log-Likelihood -337.740 -337.306  
Chi-Squared 83.855 84.722  
 
Thus, willingness to pay is the amount of money at which the respondent 
feels indifference between the present situation (status quo) and the sce-
nario proposed in the model. In the linear random utility model, willingness 
to pay (WTP) can thus be expressed as follows (Haab and McConnell 2002): 
 
(6.17)   001 )( jijjijij yzWTPyz    
 
From this, willingness to pay is calculated using the following formula: 
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(6.18)    // jjj zWTP   
 
The logit model produces the sum of €1.97/kg as the mean willingness to 
pay value, while the respective result of the probit model is only €0.21/kg. 
In the probit model, the coefficients were not statistically significant. In 
terms of these research data, the results clearly showed that the selection of 
the form of the function has a great impact on the final results. 
 
 
6.2.3 Non-parametric estimation of willingness to pay 
 
The non-parametric estimation of willingness to pay using the Turnbull esti-
mator is presented in Table 12. In this willingness to pay study, non-
monotonicity was caused, for example, by the fact that the respondents 
were proposed too many bids with intervals that were too short. In addition, 
responses always contain a certain degree of randomness and, as a conse-
quence, the original function is not genuinely monotonic (Figure 9). In Table 
12, the data have been pooled into a genuinely monotonic function. 
 
0,00
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Figure 9.   Original point estimations for the willingness to pay probabilities. 
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Table 12.  Results of the Turnbull estimator. 
 
 
Unlimited 
Turnbull 
* denotes observations 
pooled with the 
previous observation 
 
 
Bid (tj), 
euros (€) 
 
Number 
of “No” 
response
s (Nj) 
Number 
of bids 
(Tj) j
j
j T
N
F 
 
 
*jF  
 
*jf  
0.34 3 52 0.058 0.058 0.058 
0.50 3 46 0.065 0.065 0.008 
0.67 9 57 0.158 0.148 0.083 
0.84 7 51 0.137 * * 
1.01 13 47 0.277 0.277 0.128 
1.18 29 67 0.433 0.395 0.119 
1.35 20 57 0.351 * * 
1.51 23 56 0.411 0.396 0.001 
1.68 18 55 0.327 * * 
1.85 19 50 0.380 * * 
2.02 32 55 0.582 0.543 0.147 
2.19 25 52 0.481 * * 
2.35 25 50 0.500 * * 
2.52 37 60 0.617 0.610 0.067 
2.69 35 58 0.603 * * 
> 2.69 - - - 1 0.390 
 
In the Turnbull estimator, willingness to pay is calculated using the formula 
(6.19), and the results are presented in Table 13: 
 
 
(6.19) 1
0
*)(


 jMj jLB ftWTPE  
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Table 13.     Willingness to pay using the Turnbull estimator. 
 
Average willingness to pay, € 1.59 
Variance 0.005 
Mean error 0.094 
95% confidence interval WTP +/- 1.96 * mean error 1.409 
1.777 
 
 
The Kriström non-parametric estimation 
 
Kriström draws on the approach developed by Ayer et al. (1955). The differ-
ence from the above-described Turnbull estimator is that this model uses 
linear interpolation to increase the mass of probability, allowing the end 
points of the scale to be fixed to the axes (Figure 10). 
 Using this method, a willingness to pay value of €2.07 /kg is obtained. 
Thus, the Kriström non-parametric estimator produces a higher willingness 
to pay value than the Turnbull estimator. The Turnbull estimator is a conser-
vative willingness to pay estimator, because it assumes that the mass of 
probability accumulates at lower bid interval probabilities. 
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Figure 10.  Pooled empirical willingness to pay survival function, using linear 
interpolation. The thin line describes the original function.  
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6.3 Summary of the willingness to pay estimation results 
 
6.3.1 Factors explaining willingness to pay 
 
In Chapter 3.3, four hypotheses were introduced:  
(I) If there is not enough quality information on the food market, 
consumers are willing to pay for it and then indicate gaining utility 
from increased quality information. 
(II) The higher the risk a consumer associates with food products, the 
greater is the value increase and willingness to pay for quality in-
formation. 
(III) Personal and other people’s negative experiences concerning food 
quality affect willingness to pay for quality information.  
(IV) Trust in the providers of food quality information affects consumer 
willingness to pay for quality information. 
 The first binary model confirmed the premise that certain food-related 
risk factors and trust in the operators of the food chain do affect consumer 
willingness to pay. A fairly large proportion of the respondents, nearly 73% 
(protest responses were excluded from this study), were willing to pay for 
increased information related to the safety, origin and other quality attrib-
utes of beef. Based on the results, it can be stated that not enough quality 
information is available on the markets, and that the majority of consumers 
are willing to pay for quality information (Hypothesis I). 
 The results also showed that certain risk factors impact consumer will-
ingness to pay. If the respondents considered genetic modification of food or 
foodborne zoonotic diseases as harmful or extremely harmful risk factors in 
food, they were more likely to be willing to pay for quality information. The 
results produced by the models thus confirmed the premise that certain 
food-related risks affect willingness to pay for beef quality information (Hy-
pothesis II). 
 Based on the theoretical framework of this study, one might have as-
sumed that personal and other people’s negative experiences of illnesses 
caused by inferior food would increase willingness to pay and the need for 
quality information. However, the results of the binary logit model showed 
that only other people’s negative experiences affected willingness to pay, 
while personal negative experiences of inferior food did not have a similar 
effect (Hypothesis III). 
 The fourth hypothesis based on the theoretical framework of this study 
anticipated that trust in the providers of information does affect willingness 
to pay, although the actual direction could not be predicted in the light of 
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earlier studies. This study demonstrated that willingness to pay is highly de-
pendent on the respondents’ trust in the providers of information, and that 
trust does increase consumer willingness to pay for beef quality information 
(Hypothesis IV). 
 
 
6.3.2 Average willingness to pay for quality information 
 
This study estimated average willingness to pay by applying a dichotomic 
willingness to pay question in three ways: parametrically using a logit model, 
and non-parametrically using the Turnbull and Kriström distribution-free es-
timators. 
 According to Carson and Hanemann (2005), a parametric estimation of 
average willingness to pay is meaningful in the following cases: 
(I) the researcher seeks to use a specific utility function, 
(II) the researcher seeks to decrease the dependence of the estima-
tion results on the points used in the survey, 
(III) the researcher seeks to use several covariants as explanatory fac-
tors, or 
(IV) instead of one single-bound bid question, the researcher also uses 
other information in the model, applying, e.g., semi-parametric 
models (An 2000). 
 According to An (2000), the possibility of multiple options may also be a 
weakness of the parametric approach, because it may result in model speci-
fication errors. Further, the assumptions of parametric models are often too 
restrictive. As a consequence, this may motivate the researcher to find the 
“right” model that produces the “correct” average willingness to pay results, 
aligned with the researcher’s pre-conceived ideas. Occasionally, more com-
plicated models do not necessarily converge, and the researcher is forced to 
set initial values based on intuition, or trial and error (Hanemann and Kan-
ninen 1996). The two prevailing models, probit and logit models (Haab and 
McConnell 2002), were selected for use in this study.  
 In this study, the results of the logit and probit models deviated signifi-
cantly from each other. Thus, the form of the function clearly has an impact 
on the average willingness to pay estimations in these research data. The 
logit model produced an average willingness to pay value of €1.97 /kg; the 
results of this model were therefore closer to the non-parametric estima-
tions, and the coefficients were statistically significant. However, the results 
of the probit model were not statistically significant. 
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 In the non-parametric calculations of willingness to pay, the result of 
the Turnbull estimator was €1.59 /kg and the respective result of the Kris-
tröm estimator was €2.07 /kg. These results indicated an approximate price 
increase of €1.88 /kg as the average willingness to pay value for beef. 
 In addition to the bid question, the respondents were proposed average 
prices per kg (Table 14). Assume that based on the above willingness to pay 
results, the respondents paid an average of €1.88 /kg more for beef (all zero 
bids excluded). Depending on the type of beef product, average willingness 
to pay thus translates to a price increase of 24% per kilo. This percentage 
figure is fairly close to the 20% price increase obtained by Enneking (2004), 
yet at the same time it remains noticeably lower than the results obtained by 
Loureiro and Umbergen (2007). 
 
Table 14.  Average willingness to pay value for beef, and approximate per-
centage increases in consumer prices. 
 
 Price of beef*), 
euros (€) /kg 
Average willingness 
to pay, euros 
(€)/kg 
Price 
increase,      
% 
Ground beef 5.55 1.88 34% 
Rump roast 8.41 1.88 22% 
Beef strips 9.08 1.88 21% 
Average beef price 7.68 1.88 24% 
*) Average consumer prices for beef in Finland during the last 12 months prior to the 
survey conducted in March 2000. 
For comparison, the average prices in 2007 were €8.14 /kg for ground beef, €10.04 
/kg for rump roast and €11.37 /kg for beef strips, respectively (Statistics Finland 
2008). 
 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
 
The purpose of the empirical part of the study was to identify factors that 
explain consumer willingness to pay for increased quality information. 
According to the findings, consumer perceptions of specific risks in food 
partly explain their WTP. Other explanatory factors that increased willingness 
to pay were negative experiences heard from other people. This is clear 
indication that consumers fail to notice quality information, or that the 
information available on quality properties is not adequate in the market. 
Therefore they trust in quality signals that are inappropriate in their nature. 
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 According to the results, it can be concluded that the majority of the 
respondents trust in the Finnish food safety authorities and the co-operation 
of all stakeholders in the food chain. Trust is a very important factor explain-
ing willingness to pay. For some consumers, trust is linked with personal 
contact with storekeepers. For others, trust is linked with confidence in pub-
lic authorities. These empirical findings form the most prominent scientific 
contribution of this study. 
 This study examined what kind of information consumers require to 
ensure quality and safety in the food chain. This study verified that 
consumers need more information on the quality of the food on the market. 
Finnish consumers require more information on the control of foodborne 
diseases on farms, the genetic modification of production animals and animal 
feed, and on the control of medical treatment of production animals. After 
the survey for this study was conducted in 2000, animal welfare became 
headline news in Finland at the turn of the years 2007 and 2008. This public 
discussion may heighten the need for information on the control of animal 
welfare. 
 One of the main findings of this study was that the majority of Finnish 
consumers (73%) regard increased quality information as beneficial. These 
benefits were assessed using the contingent valuation method. In this study, 
four different willingness-to-pay results were elicited. According to the 
results, three of them seemed to be quite close to each other. In the logit-
model, two other variables (income, sex) were included in the model in 
addition to the bid variable. However, it seemed that the income variable did 
not have an effect on willingness to pay. In the non-parametric estimation, 
no other variables than the bid variable were utilised since the method does 
not allow the use of explanatory variables. The results showed that those 
who were willing to pay for increased information on the quality and safety 
of beef would accept an average price increase of 24% per kilogram. This 
figure is very similar to those obtained in earlier studies. 
 Based on the results, we can conclude that a relatively high proportion 
of the respondents, 42% (n = 696), was not willing to pay for quality infor-
mation. Motives underlying this unwillingness to pay were queried in order to 
make it possible to identify in the sample those respondents who protested 
the actual valuation question or the valuation scenario. These respondents 
are called protest responses since they might protest the payment mecha-
nism or the implementation of a policy change. Ethical reasons might also 
act as motivation for protest responses. 
 Results indicate that about 60% of the motives for unwillingness to pay 
represented so-called legitimate zero bids, i.e. respondents with no willing-
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ness to pay for increased information on food quality and safety. The major-
ity considered that the current labelling system guarantees sufficient food 
safety and quality. The motive with the second highest response rate was 
the inability to afford more expensive beef. The third most popular reason 
was lack of trust in package labelling, or that increased package labelling 
could ensure better quality. This is clearly a statement of no confidence in 
the capability of the system to guarantee safe meat.  
 About 28% of the responses could be interpreted as distinct protest re-
sponses. In this study, the respondents who gave even a single protest re-
sponse were excluded from the statistical analysis. This is a common method 
in valuation studies. In consequence, the number of non-respondents de-
creased to 347, and that of the entire sample to 1,290 respondents. The 
proportion of those with genuine unwillingness to pay is about 27%. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
 
 
In this study, a theoretical framework derived from the field of information 
economics was applied to the functioning of food markets. According to the 
theory, information available to purchasers can be classified into three 
categories depending on the ability of the buyers to determine differences in 
product quality. Firstly, a search good is one whose quality is determined 
before purchase. For example, in the case of food products, buyers can 
examine attributes such as colour, structure and extrinsic defects. Secondly, 
an experience good is one whose quality is determined after purchase on the 
basis of taste and composition. If we consider food safety issues, acute 
foodborne illnesses caused, for example, by Salmonella, EHEC or Listeria 
bacteria fall into this category. Thirdly, many of the characteristics related to 
the safety of foodstuffs are classified as credence attributes. The quality of a 
credence good cannot be determined either before or after purchase. In the 
case of credence goods and attributes such as heavy metals and herbicide 
residues, it may be very difficult to establish a connection between the 
quality of the original food product and the disease it may have caused. Most 
of the attributes used to define the quality of food fall into the credence 
category. 
 Stigliz (2002), one of the pioneers in the field of information economics, 
stated that the presence of even the slightest information imperfection has 
the tendency to affect market operation, whereby the traditional equilibrium 
of demand and supply cannot be achieved. It is clear that imperfect quality 
information exists on the food markets, and public actions are needed to 
guarantee a minimum safety level by regulating and controlling the markets. 
 Instead of public food control measures, the European Union is 
increasingly directing its food safety policy towards actions concerning all 
actors in the food chain. This development highlights the need for efficient 
communication of quality information throughout the food chain, from the 
very beginning to the very end. In this context, the operative word is 
traceability. The traceability of food enables the elicitation of additional 
quality information, while facilitating the communication of this information 
to consumers. 
 The literature in this study consists of three main themes: traceability; 
consumer behaviour related to both quality and safety issues and perception 
of risk; and valuation methods. As we can observe, most of the theoretical 
literature condensed for this research has been developed in 2000s. This 
indicates that at the time this study was launched in 1998, there were no 
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well-developed theoretical concepts available from earlier research for 
testing. This has also had an influence on the measurements used in this 
research, as most variables are qualitative in nature. However, the chosen 
topic has carried over to the present day and it has became even more 
relevant during the recent years.  
 The development of theoretical literature after the inception of this 
research also leads to the notion that the original research question 
presented in Chapter 1.2 is different from the hypotheses presented in 
Chapter 3.3. Some of the original research questions were more explanatory 
and more practical in nature. These questions are answered in Chapters 5.6 
and 5.7. This study reveals that some theoretical concepts appeared very 
valid when explaining consumers willingness to pay. 
 Consumers base their food choices and quality evaluation on quality 
cues. Concerning meat products, consumers use various quality cues. Today, 
risk and safety are permanent elements within the concept of food quality. 
Safety, in particular, is the attribute that consumers find very difficult to 
assess. Based on previous research, the quality cues considered by 
consumers as the most significant for the selection of beef are freshness, 
information on animal feed, and information on the country of origin. 
 In this study, the willingness to pay question was posed as a two-staged 
willingness to pay question: the respondents were first queried whether they 
had any willingness to pay at all, whereafter bids were proposed to the re-
spondents who indicated positive willingness to pay. This was clearly an im-
provement of the valuation method in that the respondents could be unam-
biguously divided into those willing to pay and those unwilling to pay, thus 
allowing the respondents with positive willingness to pay to be distinctly 
identified from the zero-respondents. 
 In further analyses, sample selection models such as Heckman’s model 
(Heckman 1979) could be applied. The model could utilise the data with two 
sequential decisions. The first one is whether to pay or not to pay a positive 
amount. If the consumer is willing to pay a positive amount, the second 
decision is the actual amount. To improve modelling, it would be ideal to 
combine willingness to pay estimates and explanatory variables within a 
single model by incorporating zero responses. This was a genuine idea that 
could not be fully implemented. Chapter 4.4 highlights the general notions of 
the validity and reliability of the research method. To test the content 
validity of the estimation results, methods such as experimental auctions 
could also be applied in further research. In further studies, the survey form 
could also be improved by targeting the willingness to pay question at 
specific meat products. 
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 This study also has a distinct managerial contribution to the operation of 
the food chain. The study produces new information on the consumers’ 
evaluation of food. The results showed that certain risk factors impact con-
sumer willingness to pay. If the respondents considered genetic modification 
of food or foodborne zoonotic diseases as harmful or extremely harmful risk 
factors in food, they were more likely to be willing to pay for quality informa-
tion. The results produced by the models thus confirmed the premise that 
certain food-related risks affect willingness to pay for beef quality informa-
tion. 
 The results also showed that safety-related quality cues are significant 
to the consumers. In the first place, the consumers would like to receive in-
formation on the control of zoonotic diseases that are contagious to humans. 
This is consistent with the fact that the consumers considered food-
transmitted zoonotic diseases as the highest risk factor in food. Similarly, 
other process-control related information (e.g., information on the use of 
drugs and on the monitoring of heavy metals and slaughterhouses) ranked 
high among the top responses. Information on any potential genetic modifi-
cation (the modification of animal genes, and the use of genetically modified 
animal feed) was also considered important, even though genetic modifica-
tion was not regarded as a high risk factor.  
 Currently, Finnish beef production is struggling with rises in the prices of 
various production inputs. Although energy and fertiliser prices have 
markedly risen, producer prices have failed to reflect this development. The 
weakening profitability of beef production has fuelled the cessation of 
farming, partly affecting the shortage of domestic beef on the market. The 
challenge is to identify measures to improve the profitability of domestic 
beef production. The good quality and safety of Finnish beef needs to be 
signalled to consumers, thereby creating economic incentives for the 
producers and markets to produce high quality beef in a more consumer-
oriented quality chain. 
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8 SUOMENKIELINEN SELOSTUS 
 
 
TIETO, RISKI JA LUOTTAMUS ELINTARVIKEKETJUSSA: NAUDAN-
LIHAN LAATUTIEDON LISÄÄMISEN TALOUDELLINEN ARVIOINTI 
CONTINGENT VALUATION –MENETELMÄLLÄ 
 
Elintarvikkeiden turvallisuus herättää yhä enemmän tiedotusvälineiden ja 
kuluttajien  kiinnostusta ja toisaalta myös huolta, kun elintarvikeriskeihin 
liittyvä tieto lisääntyy jatkuvasti. Elintarvikkeiden turvallisuus ja riskit 
nousivat esiin 1980-luvulla, kun saastuneet hampurilaiset aiheuttivat 
ihmisten kuolemantapauksia Yhdysvalloissa. Euroopassa ensimmäinen 
laajamittainen elintarviketurvallisuuteen liittyvä kriisi sai alkunsa 
Britanniasta levinneestä BSE eli ns. hullun lehmän taudista, jonka epäiltiin 
aiheuttavan ihmisillä todetun hermostoperäisen sairauden uutta muunnosta 
CJ-tautia. Syöpää aiheuttavien korkeiden dioksiinipitoisuuksien löytyminen 
elintarvikkeista sekä uhkakuvat globaalista eläinperäisten tautien 
leviämisestä ihmisiin, joista viimeisimpänä lintuinfluenssa, vaikuttavat 
siihen, että riski ja turvallisuus käsitteinä ovat tulleet jäädäkseen 
elintarvikkeista ja laadusta keskusteltaessa.  
Suomessa kuluttajien luottamus elintarvikeketjun toimintaan on hyvä, 
ja toistaiseksi elintarviketurvallisuuteen liittyviä vakavia kriisejä ei ole 
koettu. Suomessa todettiin yksi BSE-tautitapaus lehmällä vuonna 2001, sen 
vaikutukset naudanlihan kulutukseen jäivät kuitenkin lyhytaikaisiksi. Myös 
lintuinfluenssa vaikutti siipikarjanlihan kulutukseen keväällä 2006, mutta 
senkin vaikutukset jäivät Suomessa muuta Eurooppaa huomattavasti 
vähäisemmäksi, kun varsinaisia tautitapauksia tuotantoeläimillä ei todettu 
(PTT Katsaus 2006).  
Eurooppalaisen ruokaturvallisuuden parantamiseksi ja kuluttajien 
luottamuksen palauttamiseksi Euroopan komissio esitteli Valkoisessa kirjas-
saan9 (COM 2000) elintarvikkeiden turvallisuudesta merkittäviä toimen-
piteitä. Toimenpiteinä ehdotettiin muun muassa eurooppalaisen elintarvike-
turvallisuusviraston (EFSA) perustamista sekä pellolta pöytään -ajattelun 
vahvistamista elintarvikelainsäädännössä. Valkoisessa kirjassa painotetaan 
kaikkien elintarvikeketjun toimijoiden vastuuta elintarviketurvallisuudesta 
                                                     
9 Komission julkaisemat valkoiset kirjat sisältävät ehdotuksia tietyllä alalla toteutetta-
vaksi yhteisön toiminnaksi. Valkoiset kirjat sisältävät tiettyjä politiikan aloja koskevia 
virallisia ehdotuksia. Niitä julkaistaan sen jälkeen, kun asiasta julkista keskustelua 
varten ja EU:n kuulemisprosessin käynnistämiseksi on ensin julkaistu vihreä kirja. 
Julkaistut asiakirjat ovat saatavilla: http://europa.eu/documents/comm/index_fi.htm 
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sekä jäljitettävyyden parantamisesta. Elintarvikkeiden laadun valvonta 
siirtyy yhä enemmän julkiselta sektorilta elintarvikeketjun toimijoiden 
vastuulle. Lisäksi Valkoisessa kirjassa korostetaan kuluttajien tarvetta saada 
selkeää ja täsmällistä tietoa elintarvikkeiden laadusta, mahdollisista 
riskitekijöistä ja koostumuksesta.  
Suomessa kotimainen pellolta pöytään –laatuketju syntyi vuonna 1999, 
jolloin sitouduttiin kehittämään tuotteiden ja toiminnan laatua kansallisen 
laatustrategian avulla. Laatuvastuun siirtyminen yhä enemmän toimijoiden 
itsensä vastuulle korostaa luotettavan ja täsmällisen tiedon välittämistä koko 
elintarvikeketjussa aina kuluttajalle asti, jotta myös taloudelliset kannus-
timet laadun tuottamiseksi syntyisivät. Tämä taas edellyttää hyvää 
elintarvikkeen ja sen raaka-aineiden jäljitettävyyttä. Elintarvikkeiden jälji-
tettävyyttä on parannettu yrityksissä mm. omavalvontajärjestelmien kautta, 
ja erilaisten tuotetietojärjestelmien kehitystyö on elintarvikeketjussa tällä 
hetkellä käynnissä. Vuoden 2005 alusta astui voimaan EU:n asetus elin-
tarvikkeiden jäljitettävyydestä (178/2002/EY). Naudanlihan jäljitettävyyden 
ja alkuperän ilmoittamista koskevat vaatimukset ovat tätäkin asetusta 
tiukemmat.  
Syitä siihen, miksi elintarvikemarkkinoilla tarvitaan julkisen vallan 
sääntelyä esimerkiksi lainsäädännön avulla, on monia. Elintarvikkeiden 
turvallisuuteen ja laatuun liittyvät ominaisuudet ovat ns. julkishyödykkeitä. 
Termi viittaa taloustieteessä ominaisuuksiin, joita markkinat eivät usein 
hinnoittele oikein. Käytännössä tämä merkitsee sitä, ettei elintarvike-
turvallisuudelle eikä tuotteessa oleville elintarviketurvallisuusominaisuuksille 
synny markkinoilla hintaa eikä markkinamekanismi yksistään toimi 
tehokkaasti laadun tuottamisessa. Hyvälaatuisten tuotteiden tuottamisesta ei 
markkinoilla saada parempaa hintaa, vaikka laadun tuottamisen 
kustannukset olisivat korkeammat. Tilannetta kutsutaan taloustieteessä 
markkinoiden epäonnistumiseksi (market failure).  
Markkinoiden toimimattomuus johtuu muun muassa tuotteen laatua 
koskevan täydellisen informaation puuttumisesta, ja sen seurauksena 
markkinoilla olevien hyödykkeiden laatutaso alenee. Koska markkinat eivät 
kykene toimimaan tehokkaasti elintarvikkeiden laadun tuottamisessa, tarvi-
taan julkisen sektorin toimia turvaamaan markkinoilla olevien elintarvik-
keiden vähimmäislaatutaso.  
Julkisen sektorin ja toimijoiden omien laadunvalvonnan ja laatu-
standardoinnin ohella voidaan politiikkatoimenpiteenä käyttää myös infor-
maatio-ohjausta. Pakkausmerkinnät ovat informaatio-ohjauksen eräs muoto. 
Elintarvikemarkkinoilla pakkausmerkinnät voivat olla sekä julkisen sektorin 
säätelemiä pakollisia pakkausmerkintöjä että yritysten omia vapaaehtoisia 
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merkintöjä, joilla yritetään saada tuotteen erityislaatu esiin kilpaileviin 
tuotteisiin verrattuna. 
 Elintarvikeketjussa tietoa elintarvikkeiden laadusta ja turvallisuudesta 
kertyy yhä enemmän, mutta kuluttajan saatavilla oleva informaatio ei ole 
kovin merkittävästi lisääntynyt, vaikka elintarviketalouden kehitystyössä 
tavoitteena on kuluttajalähtöisyyden huomioiminen. Tutkittua tietoa kulutta-
jien tietotarpeista on toistaiseksi vain vähän saatavilla.  
 Tässä tutkimuksessa selvitettiin, millaisia ja kenen tuottamia infor-
maatiovirtoja tarvitaan laadun ja turvallisuuden todentamiseksi elintarvike-
ketjussa. Kuluttajien maksuhalukkuuden määrittämisellä selvitettiin, onko 
naudanlihan turvallisuutta ja laatua koskevaa informaatiota kuluttajien 
mielestä riittävästi saatavilla. Tämä on myös selvä tutkimuksen tuottama 
käytännön kontribuutio. Tutkimuksen empiirinen osa rajattiin koskemaan 
naudanlihaa, koska naudanlihan merkintäjärjestelmä tarjoaa mahdollisuuksia 
jäljittää luotettavasti lihan alkuperä sekä turvallisuutta, ympäristöystäväl-
lisyyttä ja eläinten hyvinvointia koskevia ominaisuuksia.  
 Tutkimuksen kysymyksenasettelu johtaa kvantitatiivisten, taloudellisten 
suureiden hakemiseen politiikkamuutoksesta eli informaation tarjoamisesta 
elintarvikkeiden turvallisuudesta ja laadusta. Ilmiö sisältää kaksi dimensiota: 
toisaalta informaation ja toisaalta elintarvikkeiden turvallisuuden, jotka ovat 
keskenään toisistaan riippuvaisia. Informaatio, joka koskee tietyn tuotteen 
ominaisuuksia, on jo itsessään hyödyke. Lisäksi näillä kummallakin ominai-
suudella on yhteinen piirre, julkishyödykemäisyys. 
 Tässä tutkimuksessa informaation taloustieteen teoriaviitekehystä 
sovellettiin elintarvikemarkkinoiden toimintaan. Kuluttajan saatavilla oleva 
laatuinformaatio voidaan jaotella kolmeen kategoriaan riippuen siitä, miten 
hyvin kuluttaja kykenee laatuominaisuuksia varmistamaan. Ensiksi, ostaja 
kykenee määrittelemään laatua ulkoisesti havaittavien tuotteen ominai-
suuksien perusteella: esimerkiksi elintarvikkeiden osalta kuluttaja tarkaste-
lee mm. väriä, rakennetta, ulkoisia vikoja sekä hintaa. Toiseksi, välittömästi 
kulutuksen jälkeen ostaja voi arvioida elintarvikkeita maun ja koostumuksen 
perusteella. Esimerkiksi elintarvikkeiden turvallisuuden osalta tällöin ilme-
nevät akuutit ruokamyrkytyksen aiheuttajat, kuten salmonella, ehec- ja 
listeriabakteerit. Kolmanneksi tulevat vasta pidemmällä aikavälillä havaitta-
vat elintarviketurvallisuusriskit, kuten esimerkiksi raskasmetallit ja torjunta-
ainejäämät.  
 Pitkällä aikavälillä havaittavissa elintarvikeriskeissä alkuperäisen 
elintarvikkeen laadun ja siitä mahdollisesti aiheutuvan sairauden yhteyttä on 
usein vaikea havaita. Esimerkiksi Suomessa tilastoiduissa elintarvike-
välitteisissä ruokamyrkytystapauksissa lähes puolessa tapauksista sairauden 
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aiheuttajaa bakteeria tai virusta ei saada selville. Lisäksi useimmat 
lievemmät tapaukset jäävät tilastojen ulkopuolelle. Elintarvikkeiden 
turvallisuus sisältää useita attribuutteja, joita kuluttajan on vaikea arvioida 
itse, ja laadun suhteen hän joutuu luottamaan pelkästään myyjään tai 
valmistajaan. Näitä ominaisuuksia kutsutaan luottamusperäisiksi ominai-
suuksiksi (credence). 
 Informaation taloustieteen paradigman uranuurtajista Stiglitz (2002) on 
todennut, että jos markkinoilla esiintyy vähäisissäkin määrin informaatio-
ongelmia, markkinat tuskin löytävät perinteisen mallin mukaisen kysynnän 
ja tarjonnan tasapainoa. Elintarvikemarkkinoilla on selvää, että etenkin 
laadun ja turvallisuuden suhteen ostajilla ei ole välttämättä tietoa elintar-
vikkeen laatuominaisuuksista ja siten elintarvikkeiden laatutason ylläpitä-
miseksi tarvitaan elintarvikemarkkinoiden sääntelyä lainsäädännön ja elin-
tarvikevalvonnan keinoin. 
 Euroopan unionissa elintarviketurvallisuuspolitiikkaa suunnataan yhä 
enemmän julkisen sektorin valvonnan sijasta elintarvikeketjun eri toimi-
joiden suuntaan, jolloin laatutiedon välittyminen kuluttajille saakka elintarvi-
keketjussa korostuu entisestään. Toisaalta tuotteiden jäljitettävyys edesaut-
taa laadukkaampien ja turvallisempien elintarvikkeiden tuottamista.  
Aikaisempien tutkimusten perusteella kuluttajat muodostavat 
elintarvikkeen laatukäsityksen perustuen laatuvihjeisiin. Lihatuotteilla näitä 
laatuvihjeitä on useita, mutta ostotilanteessa kuluttajat käyttävät vain muu-
tamaa vihjettä, kuten lihan rasvapitoisuutta ja ostopaikkaa.  
Riski ja elintarvikkeiden turvallisuus ovat nykyään olennaisia käsitteitä 
elintarvikkeiden laadun osatekijöinä. Turvallisuus on luottamusperäinen 
ominaisuus, jonka arvioiminen kuluttajalle on erityisen vaikeaa. Aikai-
sempien tutkimusten perusteella on todettu, että merkittävimpinä laatu-
attribuutteina naudanlihalla kuluttajat pitävät tuoreutta, tietoa eläimen 
ruokinnasta ja alkuperämaata.  
Tämä tutkimus osoitti, että suurin osa suomalaisista kuluttajista (73 %) 
kokee hyötyvänsä uusien naudanlihan laatua ja erityisesti turvallisuutta 
kuvaavien laatutietojen lisäämisestä. Tutkimuksessa kuluttajien kokemaa 
hyötyä laatutiedon lisäämisestä selvitettiin kuluttajien maksuhalukkuuden 
avulla. Tutkimusmenetelmänä oli contingent valuation –menetelmä. Ne 
kuluttajat, jotka ilmoittivat maksuhalukkuudestaan, maksaisivat laatu-
tiedosta noin 24 prosenttia naudanlihan kilohintaan lisää. Summa on 
samansuuruinen kuin vastaavantyyppisissä tutkimuksissa.  
Tutkimuksen perusteella kuluttajat kaipaavat elintarvikemarkkinoille 
lisää laatutietoa. Suomalaiset kuluttajat kaipaavat nykyisten pakkaus-
merkintöjen lisäksi tietoa tilavalvonnoista eläintautien suhteen, eläinten 
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geenimuuntelusta ja lääkeaineiden käytön valvonnasta. Lisäksi kyselyn 
toteuttamisen jälkeen Suomessa eläinten hyvinvointi nousi voimakkaasti 
esiin vuodenvaihteessa 2007-2008.  
Tutkimuksessa selvitettiin maksuhalukkuutta selittäviä tekijöitä ja 
osoitettiin, että kuluttajan riskin kokeminen haitallisiksi elintarvikkeissa, 
toisten huonot kokemukset ja luottamus ketjun toimijoihin selittävät eniten 
kuluttajien maksuhalukkuutta. Empiirisesti näitä muuttujia ei ole testattu 
aiemmin, ja tämä on selvä tutkimuksen tuottama tieteellinen kontribuutio.  
Luottamus elintarvikeketjun toimijoihin on hyvin keskeinen kuluttajan 
maksuhalukkuutta selittävä tekijä. Joillekin vastaajille se on luottamusta 
kauppiaan tarjoamaan lihaan, joillekin luottamusta elintarvikevalvonta-
viranomaisiin ja osalle vastaajista koko elintarvikeketjun tuottamaan tietoon. 
Suomessa kuluttajien luottamus on pysynyt varsin vakaana eikä suuria 
elintarvikekriisejä ole meillä esiintynyt.  Elintarvikkeiden turvallisuus on siksi 
kuluttajalle lähes aina luottamukseen perustuva laatuominaisuus ja 
laatutiedon lisääminen näistä ominaisuuksista hyödyttää suurinta osaa 
suomalaisista kuluttajista.  
 Kotimainen kansallinen laatustrategia pyrkii kokoamaan hajallaan 
olevan laatutiedon elintarvikealan laatutietojärjestelmään. Laatustrategiassa 
tunnistetaan kotimaisen tuotannon kilpailueduksi jäljitettävyys ja kotimai-
seen tuotantoon ja tuotantotapaan liittyvä tieto. Oleellista elintarvikeketjun 
toiminnan kannalta on, että kuluttajien tietotarpeista keskeisimmät laatu-
vihjeet kyetään viestittämään elintarvikeketjussa luotettavasti aina kulutta-
jalle asti.  
 Tällä hetkellä suomalainen naudanlihantuotanto taistelee useiden 
tuotantopanosten hinnannousua vastaan. Tuottajahintojen nousu ei ole 
pysynyt energian ja tuotantopanosten hintojen nousun tahdissa. Kannatta-
vuuden aleneminen on kiihdyttänyt tuotannosta luopumista, ja siten 
kotimaisen naudanlihan tarjonta on pienentynyt. Elintarvikeketjun haasteena 
on tunnistaa ne toimenpiteet, joilla kotimaisen naudanlihantuotannon talou-
dellisia edellytyksiä vahvistetaan. Suomalaisen naudanlihan erinomainen 
laatu pitäisi saada myös kuluttajien tietoisuuteen. Tämä loisi paremmat 
taloudelliset kannustimet tuottajille. Siten laatutiedon lisääntyessä markkinat 
tuottaisivat korkealaatuista naudanlihaa kuluttajien vaatimusten mukaisesti 
suuntautuvassa elintarvikeketjussa.  
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APPENDIX 
 
                                                            Survey Form 
GallupKanava, week 09/2000 
 
Label Variable Coding Recoding for 
the binary 
model 
Code number for 
household 
TALOUS   
Code number for individual HLO   
How often do you have a 
meal made from beef? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NAUTA1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = daily 
2 = several 
times a week 
3 = about once 
a week 
4 = twice or 
three times a 
month 
5 = about once 
a month 
6 = rarely 
7 = never 
Rarely eats 
beef:  
1 = rarely or 
never, 
0 = otherwise 
 
Do you ever, or even very 
infrequently, buy beef? 
 
NAUTA2 
 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
Buys beef :  
1 = yes,  
0 = no 
I BUYING AND COOKING 
BEEF 
   
When you are buying beef, 
how often do you choose 
it… 
 
… from a meat clerk at a 
meat counter? 
 
 
V0138 
 
 
 
 
1 = never 
2 = occasionally 
3 = about every 
second time 
4 = almost every 
time 
5 = every time 
 
… from a self-service shelf, 
packaged by the store 
(styrofoam tray, plastic 
wrapping)? 
V0139 
 
same as above  
… from a self-service shelf, 
industrially packaged? 
V0140 same as above  
… directly from a producer? V0141 same as above  
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When you are buying beef, 
how often do you take into 
consideration the following 
information or attributes? 
… “use by” date 
V0142 
 
 
 
same as above Checks the “use 
by” date in the 
current package 
labelling:  
1 = every time 
or almost every 
time, 
0 = otherwise 
… producer V0143 same as above  
… price V0144 same as above  
… fat content V0145 same as above  
…“Finnish beef” marking V0146 same as above Checks the 
Finnish beef 
marking in the 
current package 
labelling:  
1 = every time 
or almost every 
time,  
0 = otherwise 
… producer’s quality label V0147 same as above  
… colour of the beef V0148 same as above  
… production date or 
packaging date 
V0149 same as above  
… organic food label  
V0150 
 
same as above Checks the 
organic food 
label in the 
current package 
labelling:  
1 = every time 
or almost every 
time,  
0 = otherwise 
… Finnish food label  
V0151 
 
same as above  
Before buying beef, how 
often do you find out its 
country of origin, e.g., from 
a meat counter clerk, shelf 
signs or packaging? 
V0152 
 
 
 
same as above 
 
 
 
If information on the origin 
of beef used in a meal e.g. 
at a workplace cafeteria or 
restaurant is not readily 
available, how often do you 
find out about it? 
V0153 
 
 
 
same as above  
In your household, how V0154 1 = never  
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often do you prepare a 
meal containing beef… 
 
…from untreated whole 
meat, completely by 
yourself from beginning to 
end (e.g., tenderloin or filet 
mignon, rump roast)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 = less often 
than once a 
month 
3 = 1-3 times a 
month 
4 = 1-2 times a 
week 
5 = several 
times a week 
 
In your household, how 
often do you prepare a 
meal containing beef… 
…from ground beef? 
V0155 
 
same as above  
… from pre-sliced or cubed, 
or pre-marinated or 
breaded beef, etc.? 
V0156 same as above  
… from pre-cooked beef 
foodstuffs (pre-cooked 
meatballs, sausages, etc.)? 
V0157 same as above  
… prepared ready-to-eat 
meals which require 
heating (microwave meals, 
etc.)? 
 
V0158 
 
same as above  
II OPINIONS ON BEEF 
AND ITS SAFETY 
   
What do you think about 
the following statements? 
In Finland, the authorities 
responsible for food safety 
make sure that the beef 
sold in the stores is… 
 
… safe to eat up to and 
including its “use by” date 
V0159 
 
 
 
1 = completely 
disagree 
2 = somewhat 
disagree 
3 = neither 
disagree nor 
agree 
4 = somewhat 
agree 
5 = completely 
agree 
 
… I only ever buy beef on 
special offer 
V0160 same as above  
… imported beef is as safe 
as Finnish beef 
V0161 same as above  
… quality beef is not 
usually cheap to buy 
V0162 same as above  
… industrially packaged 
beef is safer than store-
packaged beef 
V0163 same as above  
… beef-related incidents V0164 same as above  
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are caused by the fact that 
producing high-quality beef 
does not pay well enough 
… I trust that the 
storekeeper will sell only 
safe beef to the customers 
V0165 same as above Has trust in 
storekeepers:  
1 = completely 
or somewhat 
agree,  
0 = otherwise 
In food, how harmful do you 
consider the following: 
… excessive fat 
 
 
 
V0166 
 
 
 
 
1 = very harmful 
2 = fairly harmful
3 = somewhat 
harmful 
4 = not harmful 
at all 
5 = cannot say 
 
… pesticide and herbicide 
residues 
V0167 same as above  
… additives and 
preservatives 
V0168 same as above  
… nitrate and nitrite V0169 same as above  
… environmental pollutants 
(lead, cadmium, PCB,PAH) 
V0170 same as above  
… excessive sugar V0171 same as above  
… drug residues 
(hormones, antibiotics) 
V0172 same as above  
… excessive salt V0173 same as above  
… diseases transmitted 
from animals to humans 
(e.g., Salmonella, EHEC, 
campylobacteria) 
V0174 same as above Considers 
foodborne 
zoonotic 
diseases 
harmful:  
1 = very or fairly 
harmful,  
0 = somewhat / 
not harmful at all 
/ cannot say 
… genetically modified 
organisms (GMO) in animal 
feed, or genetic 
modification of animals 
V0175 same as above Considers 
genetic 
modification of 
food harmful: 
1 = very or fairly 
harmful 
0 = somewhat / 
not harmful at all 
/ cannot say 
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III WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
FOR INFORMATION ON 
FOOD SAFETY AND 
QUALITY 
 
In Finland, the stakeholders 
in the food chain 
(producers, food 
processing industry, retail 
sector, consumers and 
public authorities) have 
agreed on common goals 
through which attributes 
related to the quality and 
safety of Finnish food can 
be demonstrated to the 
consumers. More 
information on food quality 
and safety will be 
communicated to the 
consumers using a quality 
information system which is 
currently under 
development. 
 
Do you believe that such 
quality information as 
described above, produced 
by all stakeholders in the 
food chain, creates added 
value for Finnish food (= 
benefit to consumers)? 
 
NAUTA39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
3 = cannot say 
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Please read the following 
before responding to further 
questions. 
 
Information on the beef 
labelling system. 
 
The labelling system used 
in Finland allows beef to be 
traced back to the farm and 
animal it came from. The 
labelling process begins 
when a calf is born, with the 
insertion of yellow eartags 
in both ears. The eartag 
carries an individual bovine 
ID that stays with the 
animal for its whole lifetime. 
The owner reports the 
details of an eartagged calf 
to the bovine register, 
which is maintained by the 
public authorities. The sale 
of an animal from one farm 
to another is always 
reported to the register. 
The last report made by the 
owner specifies the 
slaughterhouse to which 
the animal was sent. On 
one eartag the animal 
carries a number that 
allows the tracing of 
information on its feeding 
and possible illnesses and 
medication. The bovine ID 
follows the carcass in the 
slaughterhouse, and all the 
way to the store. 
 
What does the beef 
labelling system mean to 
the consumer? Through the 
labelling system, the 
consumers can be given 
information on the animal 
from which the beef was 
produced. Before buying 
NAUTA40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
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beef, the consumer could 
also receive information on 
the feeding and any 
medication given to the 
animal, on animal welfare, 
and on aspects related to 
the environmental impact of 
the production process. In 
terms of food safety, it 
would mean information on 
quality control, and on the 
safety of Finnish beef. 
 
Would you be willing to pay 
for the creation and 
maintenance of an 
information system that 
provided you with better 
information on the origin, 
production method and 
safety of beef? 
Would you be willing to pay 
FIM 2 /kg more than 
currently, for more 
information on the safety, 
origin and production 
method of beef? 
 
If necessary, refer to the 
following price listing. 
 
PRICE LISTING 
Average consumer beef 
prices in Finland during the 
last 12 months. 
- ground beef FIM 33 /kg 
- rump roast    FIM 50 /kg 
- beef strips    FIM 54 /kg 
V0181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
 
 
 
   willing to pay FIM 3 /kg 
MORE 
 
V0183 
 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
 
   willing to pay FIM 4 /kg 
MORE 
V0185 same as above  
   willing to pay FIM 5 /kg 
MORE 
V0187 same as above  
   willing to pay FIM 6 /kg 
MORE 
V0189 same as above  
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   willing to pay FIM 7 /kg 
MORE 
V0191 same as above  
   willing to pay FIM 8 /kg 
MORE 
V0193 same as above  
   willing to pay FIM 9 /kg 
MORE 
V0195 same as above  
   willing to pay FIM 10 /kg 
MORE 
V0197 same as above  
   willing to pay FIM 11 /kg 
MORE 
V0199 same as above  
   willing to pay FIM 12 /kg 
MORE 
V0201 same as above  
   willing to pay FIM 13 /kg 
MORE 
V0203 same as above  
   willing to pay FIM 14 /kg 
MORE 
V0205 same as above  
   willing to pay FIM 15 /kg 
MORE 
V0207 same as above  
   willing to pay FIM 16 /kg 
MORE 
V0209 same as above  
For increased information 
on the safety, origin and 
production method of beef, 
I would be willing to pay  
 
CHECK THE 
APPROPRIATE OPTION 
… maximum FIM 2 /kg 
more 
… maximum FIM 3-5 /kg 
more 
… maximum FIM 6-7 /kg 
more 
… maximum FIM 11-12 /kg 
more 
… maximum FIM 13-15 /kg 
more 
… over FIM 16 /kg more 
NAUTA42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1= maximum 
FIM 2 /kg 
2= maximum 
FIM 3-5 /kg 
3= maximum 
FIM 6-7 /kg 
4 = maximum 
FIM 8-10 /kg 
5 = maximum 
FIM 11-12 /kg 
6 = maximum 
FIM 13-15 /kg 
7 = >FIM 16 /kg 
more 
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If you responded NO to 
question NAUTA40 
 
I am not willing to pay more 
for increased information 
on the safety, origin and 
production method of beef, 
because… 
… I do not know exactly 
what information would be 
available 
V0212C01 
 
 
 
 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
 
… the origin and quality of 
food is not important to me 
V0212C02 same as above  
… I cannot afford to buy 
more expensive food 
V0212C03 same as above  
… current labelling 
provides enough 
information 
V0212C04 same as above  
… food products are 
always risky, regardless of 
where they were produced 
and labelled 
V0212C05 same as above  
… another reason, what? 
(Please write your 
response in the space 
below.) 
V0212C99 same as above  
IV REQUIREMENTS FOR 
BEEF-RELATED 
INFORMATION 
   
How important would you 
consider the following 
information on beef, in 
addition to the currently 
available information? 
 
Origin: country of origin? 
V0213 
 
 
 
 
1 = not 
important at all 
2 = 2 
3 = 3 
4 = 4 
5 = very 
important 
 
Origin: region of origin 
(e.g., province, county)? 
V0214 same as above  
Origin: production farm? V0215 same as above  
Origin: production animal V0216 same as above  
Production animal: breed? V0217 same as above  
Production animal: age? V0218 same as above  
Production animal: sex? V0219 same as above  
Drugs: has the animal been 
given any medication? 
V0220 same as above  
Drugs: has the animal been 
given any hormones? 
V0221 same as above  
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Genetic modification: has 
the production animal been 
subject to genetic 
modification? 
V0222 same as above  
Genetic modification: do 
animal feeds contain 
genetically modified 
material? 
V0223 same as above  
Operation of the beef 
production chain: when was 
the animal slaughtered and 
how long did it take for the 
beef to reach the consumer 
(duration of beef production 
process)? 
V0224 
 
same as above  
Operation of the beef 
production chain: how long 
does animal transportation 
take? 
V0225 same as above  
Price of beef: how much is 
the producer paid? 
V0226 same as above  
Price of beef: how much 
are other stakeholders in 
the food chain paid (food 
industry, retail sector?) 
V0227 
 
same as above  
Production method: does 
the production farm have 
an agricultural quality 
control certification, ISO 
9002 and/or ISO 14001? 
V0228 
 
same as above  
Production method: what 
kind of animal feeds does 
the farm use (e.g., 
domestically produced, 
Salmonella-free)? 
V0229 
 
same as above  
Production method: control 
of animal welfare and 
conditions? 
V0230 same as above  
Production method: is 
attention paid to nutrient 
washout? 
V0231 same as above  
Production method: is 
attention paid to the 
reduced use of pesticides 
and herbicides? 
V0232 same as above  
Production method: do the 
animals have free-range, 
outdoor access? 
V0233 same as above  
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Control information: what 
control procedures are in 
place on farms against 
diseases transmitted from 
animals to humans 
(Salmonella, EHEC)? 
V0234 
 
same as above  
Control information: how is 
the use of antibiotics and 
other veterinary drugs 
controlled? 
V0235 same as above  
Control information: 
inspections of 
slaughterhouses and 
inspection results? 
V0236 same as above  
Control information: how 
often is beef inspected for 
heavy metals and pesticide 
and herbicide residues? 
V0237 
 
same as above  
Control information: how 
often is beef inspected for 
EHEC and Salmonella 
bacteria? 
V0238 same as above  
In addition to the issues 
listed above, are there 
other beef-related details 
on which… 
…you would like to receive 
more information? 
V0239 
 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
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In your opinion, who would 
you consider the most 
reliable provider of 
information on food safety? 
 
CHOOSE ONLY ONE 
OPTION 
    Finnish food control 
authorities 
    Private research 
laboratories equipped for 
quality inspections 
    The whole food chain 
together (producers, food 
processing industry, retail 
sector, consumers, 
agricultural expert 
organisations, research 
organisations and public 
authorities) 
    A centralised food safety 
authority maintained by the 
European Union 
food industry and food 
businesses? 
    Consumer organisations 
    Someone else, who? 
(Please write your 
response in the space 
below.) 
    Cannot say 
NAUTA71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = Finnish 
authorities 
2 = private 
research 
laboratories 
3 = everyone in 
the food chain 
4 = EU food 
safety authority 
5 = food industry 
and food 
businesses 
6 = consumer 
organisations 
98 = someone 
else 
99 = cannot say 
 
Dummy variable 
which takes 
value 1 if 
respondent 
choose the 
provider of 
information, and 
0 otherwise; 
 
Has trust in the 
information 
provided by the 
Finnish 
authorities; 
 
Has trust in the 
information 
provided by the 
whole food 
chain together; 
 
Has trust in the 
information 
provided by 
private research 
laboratories; 
 
Has trust in the 
information 
provided by 
consumer 
organisations; 
 
Has trust in the 
information 
provided by the 
food industry; 
 
Has trust in the 
information 
provided by the 
European Union 
authorities 
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In your opinion, who would 
respond fastest 
(communication, necessary 
actions) to a potential 
health hazard to humans? 
CHOOSE ONLY ONE 
OPTION 
    Finnish food control 
authorities 
    A centralised food safety 
authority maintained by the 
European Union 
    The food business 
owning the product 
    Consumer organisations 
    Someone else, who? 
(Please write your 
response in the space 
below.) 
    Cannot say 
NAUTA72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = Finnish 
authorities 
2 = EU food 
safety authority 
3 = food 
business owning 
the product 
4 = consumer 
organisation 
98 = someone 
else 
99 = cannot say 
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In your opinion, who has 
the best information on 
food safety? 
CHOOSE ONLY ONE 
OPTION 
    Finnish food control 
authorities 
    Private research 
laboratories equipped for 
quality inspections 
    The whole food chain 
together (producers, food 
processing industry, retail 
sector, consumers, 
agricultural expert 
organisations, research 
organisations and public 
authorities) 
    A centralised food safety 
authority maintained by the 
European Union 
    The food industry and 
food businesses? 
    Consumer organisations 
    The media 
    Someone else, who? 
(Please write your 
response in the space 
below.) 
    Cannot say 
NAUTA73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = Finnish 
authorities 
2 = private 
research 
laboratories 
3 = everyone in 
the food chain 
4 = EU food 
safety authority 
5 = food industry 
and food 
businesses 
6 = consumer 
organisations 
7 = media 
98 = someone 
else 
99 = cannot say 
 
 
 
Have you heard or read 
about the following, mostly 
European, discussions 
related to food safety? 
CHECK ALL SUBJECTS 
YOU HAVE HEARD OR 
READ ABOUT 
… Salmonella 
V0243C1 
 
 
 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
 
… EHEC bacterium, or 
enterohaemorrhagic 
Escherichia coli 
V0243C2 same as above  
… use of antibiotics in 
animals 
V0243C3 same as above  
… mad cow disease or 
BSE 
V0243C4 same as above  
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… genetic modification of 
animal feed materials or 
production animals 
V0243C5 same as above  
… use of hormones in beef 
production 
V0243C6 same as above  
… use of waste sludge in 
animal feeds 
V0243C7 same as above  
… dioxin in animal feeds V0243C8 same as above  
… I have neither heard nor 
read about any of the 
issues listed above 
V0243C9 same as above  
Have you yourself, or has a 
member of your family 
fallen sick from inferior food 
(in Finland or abroad)? 
 
NAUTA75 
 
 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
3 = cannot say 
 
Do you have a relative or 
friend who has fallen sick 
from inferior food (in 
Finland or abroad)? 
NAUTA76 
 
same as above Knows or has 
heard of people 
who have fallen 
sick from inferior 
food: 
1 = yes 
0 = no / cannot 
say 
How common do you 
consider illnesses caused 
by food made in Finnish 
households? 
 
 
 
V0246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = very rare 
2 = fairly rare 
3 = fairly 
common 
4 = very 
common 
5 = cannot say 
 
How common do you 
consider illnesses caused 
by food made at Finnish 
workplace cafeterias, 
hospitals or schools? 
 
V0247 
 
 
same as above  
How common do you 
consider illnesses caused 
by food made at Finnish 
restaurants? 
 
V0248 
 
same as above  
How common do you 
consider food-caused 
illnesses in Finland? 
 
 
V0249 
 
same as above  
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How common do you 
consider illnesses caused 
by food made elsewhere in 
Europe? 
 
V0250 
 
same as above  
Are you familiar with the 
primary production of beef 
(farms)? 
 
CHOOSE ONLY ONE 
OPTION 
…yes, I am a beef producer 
myself 
…yes, I have connections 
with beef production 
through family members, 
relatives or friends 
…yes, I have visited a beef 
farm 
…yes, my occupation or 
training is closely related to 
beef production 
…yes, for a reason not 
specified above 
…no, I am not familiar with 
beef production, nor do I 
have any connections with 
beef producers 
 
 
NAUTA82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = ‘yes, is a 
beef producer’ 
2 = ‘yes, has 
connections’ 
3 = ‘yes, has 
visited a beef 
farm’ 
4 = ‘yes, through 
occupation’ 
5 = ‘yes, for 
another reason’ 
6 = ‘not familiar’ 
 
 
Do any of your family 
members have one of the 
following special diets? 
 
CHECK ALL DIETS IN 
YOUR FAMILY 
 
…vegetarian 
V0256C1 
 
 
 
 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
 
…low-lactose or completely 
lactose-free 
V0256C2 same as above  
…low-fat V0256C3 same as above  
…low-salt or salt-free V0256C4 same as above  
…gluten-free V0256C5 same as above  
…other special diet V0256C6 same as above  
…no special diets V0256C7 same as above  
Sex of respondent 
 
T1 
 
1 = female 
2 = male 
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Age of respondent 
 
 
 
 
 
T2 
 
 
 
 
 
01-24 = ‘<= 24 
yrs’ 
25-34 = ‘25-34 
yrs’ 
35-44 = ‘35-44 
yrs’ 
45-54 = ‘45-54 
yrs’ 
55-99 = ‘>= 55 
yrs’ 
other = 
‘other/cannot 
say/no 
response’ 
 
Size of household 
 
 
 
 
T9 
 
 
 
 
1 = 1 person 
2 = 2 persons 
3 = 3 persons 
4-99 = 4 
persons 
other = 
other/cannot 
say/ no 
response 
 
Occupation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,2  = 
managerial or 
high-level 
position 
3  = low-level 
position 
4  = employee 
5,6  = self-
employed / 
farmer 
9  = retired 
7,8,10,11  = 
other 
other = 
other/cannot 
say/no response 
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Gross income of household 
 
 
 
 
T102 
 
 
 
 
1-4 = maximum 
FIM 8.000 
/month 
5-6 = FIM 8.001-
14.000 /month 
7-8 = FIM 
14.001-22.000 
/month 
9-11 = minimum 
FIM 22.001 
/month 
12,13 = cannot 
say/no response 
 
Type of residential area 
 
 
 
T103 
 
 
 
1 = city or town 
centre 
2 = suburban 
3 = semi-urban 
4 = rural, 
sparsely 
populated 
 
Party voted in 1999? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = Social 
Democratic 
Party 
2 = Centre Party 
of Finland 
3 = National 
Coalition Party 
4 = Left Alliance 
5 = Green 
League 
6-11 = other 
party 
12 = did not vote
13-14 = will not 
say 
other= 
other/cannot 
say/no reponse 
 
Responsible for grocery 
shopping 
 
 
 
T105 
 
 
 
1 = yes, alone 
2 = yes, shares 
responsibility 
3 = no 
other = cannot 
say/no response 
Has 
responsibility for 
grocery 
shopping, alone 
or together with 
someone else:  
1 = yes, alone or 
yes, shares 
responsibility: 
 0 = otherwise 
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Special diets 
 
 
 
T106 
 
 
 
1 = vegetarian 
2 = yes, some 
3 = none 
other = cannot 
say/no response 
 
Region of residence 
 
 
 
 
T107 
 
 
 
 
1 = Uusimaa 
region 
2 = Southern 
Finland 
3 = Eastern 
Finland 
4 = Central 
Finland 
5 = Northern 
Finland 
 
Age of children 
 
 
 
T108 
 
 
 
1 = no children 
2 = children 
under 6 years of 
age 
3 = children over 
6 years of age 
other = cannot 
say/no response 
 
Net income of household 
 
 
 
 
T109 
 
 
 
 
1-5000   = 
maximum FIM 
5.000 /month 
5001-10000  = 
FIM 5.001-
10.000 /month 
10001-15000  = 
FIM 10.001-
15.000 /month 
15001-high   = 
over FIM 15.001 
/month 
other = cannot 
say/no response 
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Level of vocational or 
academic education or 
training 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,7 = no 
vocational or 
academic 
training /other 
2 = vocational 
training course 
3 = vocational 
school etc. 
4 = lower-level 
vocational or 
academic 
training or 
education 
5,6 = higher-
level vocational 
or academic 
training or 
education 
other = cannot 
say/no response 
 
Basic education 
 
 
 
 
T111 
 
 
 
 
1 = primary 
school (pre-
1970s system) 
2 = middle 
school (pre-
1970s system), 
or 
comprehensive 
school (post-
1970s system) 
3 = upper 
secondary 
school 
other = cannot 
say/no response 
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